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Abstract 
Cryptography is a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows secure 
electronic communications by legitimate users. On the other hand, it can be 
used by criminals to thwart law enforcement efforts and by foreign countries 
to prevent security agencies from gathering intelligence information about 
these countries. 
However, the widespread use of cryptography is critical to the establish-
ment of the Information Superhighway. In order to prevent illegal users 
from enjoying the same convenience, the most straight forward solution is to 
escrow every user's private key. 
Governments' prime concern focuses on law enforcement and national 
security. However, users' major worries are the security and potential abuses 
of these systems by the authorities. This is particularly important because, 
with the explosive growth of the Internet, a user's private key can be used 
to access a wide range of information about him/her. 
In recent years, numerous key escrow schemes have been proposed but 
their success will ultimately depend on the trust and acceptance by users. 
Unfortunately, all proposed systems suffer from one common weakness: 
concentration of trust. Even if the private key is split among several trustees, 
it is still too concentrated and thus too insecure. 
Another subtle yet equally important weakness is the contradiction to the 
spirit of democracy. In these schemes, user's fundamental right of privacy 
is at the mercy of the governments and a few trustees. It is unfair for most 
legitimate users to hand over their private keys to the authorities (or their 
agents), even before they have started any electronic communication. Given 
the fact that governments are strong and users are weak, this is unfair and 
undemocratic. 
This thesis proposes a key escrow scheme which is not only secure but also 
fair and democratic by introducing the concept of "electronic jury" similar 
to the jury system in the common law. This is a new mechanism to achieve 
proper balance of power and mutual trust by both users and authorities by 
distributing the key shares in the hands of electronic jury until they are 
required for lawful recovery. 
Publication arising out of this thesis 
Chor Wall Man, R. Sain.vi-Naini. •'Denu^cratic Key Escrow Scheme," in Sec-
ond Australasian Conji rence on I iifoi-!;i a I ion Security and Privacy (ACISP'97)^ 
July 1997, published by Springer-Veriii'i; in the Lectures Notes of Computer 
vScience series. 
I hearby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. 
I also declare that the material presented within is my own work, except 
where duly acknowledged, and that I am not aware of any similar work 
either prior to this thesis, or currently being pursued. 
I certify that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree in any other 
university or institution. 
Chor Wah Man 
May 1997 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Motivation 1 
1.2 Nature of the Problem 2 
1.3 Objectives 3 
1.4 Scope of Study 3 
1.5 Outline 4 
2 Importance of Cryptography and Information Superhighway 5 
2.1 Privacy Issue 5 
2.2 Development of Cryptography 6 
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography and Its Weaknesses 7 
2.2.2 Pubhc key Cryptography 8 
2.2.3 Importance of Cryptography 8 
2.3 Potential Threats of Cryptography 9 
2.3.1 Threats 9 
2.3.2 Crypto Anarchy 10 
2.4 Government PoHcy 11 
2.5 Information Superhighway 12 
2.5.1 Cryptographic Services 12 
2.5.2 Key Management Infrastructures 12 
3 Challenge 14 
3.1 Problems with Existing Key Escrow Schemes 14 
3.2 Orwellian World 15 
3.3 Dilemma 16 
3.4 This Work 17 
4 Related Works 19 
4.1 Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 19 
4.1.1 Brief Description of EES 19 
4.1.2 Operation 20 
4.1.3 Criticism 21 
4.1.4 Clipper II & III 22 
4.2 Fair Public Key Cryptosystems 22 
4.3 Encapsulated Key Escrow 23 
4.4 Verifiable Partial Key Ecsrow 23 
4.5 A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services . . 24 
4.6 Oblivious Key Escrow 24 
4.7 Translucent Cryptography 25 
4.8 Binding Cryptography 25 
4.9 A Matter of Trust 26 
5 Jury System 27 
5.1 Introduction 27 
5.2 Origin 28 
5.3 Early History 29 
5.4 Characteristics 29 
5.5 Selection Procedure 30 
5.6 Merits 30 
5.7 Trials in Continental Law 31 
5.8 Bulwark of Civil Liberty 32 
6 Democratic Key Escrow Schemes 34 
6.1 Electronic Jury System 34 
6.1.1 New Mechanism 34 
6.1.2 Abstract Model for Electronic Jury System 35 
6.2 System Description 36 
6.2.1 Entities 36 
6.2.2 Requirements 37 
6.3 Scheme 1 38 
6.3.1 Key Registration 38 
6.3.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 40 
6.3.3 Efficiency Consideration 40 
6.4 Scheme 2 . . . 41 
6.4.1 Key Registration 41 
6.4.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 43 
6.4.3 Efficiency Consideration 43 
6.5 Scheme 3 43 
6.5.1 Key Registration 44 
6.5.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 45 
6.5.3 Efficiency Consideration 46 
7 Security Analysis 47 
7.1 Strengths 47 
7.2 Possible Attacks 49 
7.3 Subliminal Channel 50 
8 Practical Consideration 53 
8.1 Key Recovery 53 
8.2 Selection Criteria of Jurors 53 
8.3 Key Renewal 54 
8.4 Share Transfer 54 
8.5 Implementation 54 
8.6 Wider Applications 54 
9 Conclusion 56 
A Source Code for Implementation of Scheme 3 57 
ni 
The only sure bulwark of continuing liberty is a government strong enough 
to protect the interests of the people, and a people strong enough and well 
enough informed to maintain its sovereign control over the government [37]. 
President Roosevelt of USA 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter firstly explains the origin of the problem and the motivation of 
this thesis. It then discusses the nature of this problem. Objectives are then 
set out as a roadmap for the remaining parts of this thesis. As key escrow is 
a very complex issue, this chapter places a scope of study in this thesis. 
1.1 Motivation 
Rapid advances in computer and telecommunication technologies have revo-
lutionarizd people's ways of communications, and have become an essential 
element of modern life. They have removed distance as a geographical barrier 
and have turned the world into a big global village. 
As open communication networks are insecure, users need to use cryptog-
raphy to protect their privacy in modern communications. However, cryptog-
raphy is a dual-edged sword. While strong cryptography provides absolute 
privacy unavailable before, it can be abused by criminals to avoid electronic 
surveillance so that it also presents a serious threat to effective law enforce-
ment and national security. In fact, cryptography has upset the traditional 
balance of power between individuals and authorities. 
Government's past strategy was to impose strict control in the use of cryp-
tography (e.g., by Hmiting the length of the encryption key). This seriously 
reduces the protection to legitimate users and thus cannot be accepted as a 
long-term solution for secure communications in the emerging information so-
ciety. Realising this, government's new approach is to allow the widespread 
use of cryptography subject to the condition that every user must escrow 
his/her decryption key with a trusted party to enable emergency key recov-
ery for law enforcement purposes. Besides other inherent security problems, 
such key escrow systems may be abused by the authorities to intrude into 
users' privacy in the name of law enforcement by obtaining the decryption 
keys to conduct wiretaps. Moreover, it is conceptually wrong to force users 
(either by law or by creating a substantial market [26]) to hand over their de-
cryption keys to the authorities even before they have started any electronic 
communications. Instead, they should be required to do so only if they are 
suspected of committing a serious crime. 
Thus, before one can fully relax and enjoy the fruit of the proximity and 
accessibility provided by the emerging Information Superhighway, one must 
guard against barbarism due to the abuse of privacy by users or tyranny due 
to the abuse of power by authorities in the emerging electronic community. 
This dilemma is the motivation behind this thesis. 
1.2 Nature of the Problem 
In order to strike a new balance of power between individuals and authorities, 
one must fully appreciate the nature of this problem: 
• This is an ethical problem because it involves social values and human 
judgement of what is good and what is bad about privacy. If one be-
lieves that privacy is evil and intrusion of one's privacy by government 
is meritorious because it only shows that the government really cares 
about him/her, then the discussion can end here. Also, one believes 
that a democratic society is better than a totalitarian one. 
• This is a political problem because there is power struggle between 
users and authority. It is the new battle field between ruling class and 
the ruled class which should ideally lead to a rational compromise or 
balance of power between two classes. 
• This is a legal problem because it involves enforcement of law and 
order (or policing) extended to the electronic media. A suspect must 
be assumed innocent until proven guilty and the process must not only 
be fair but also seen to be fair. In case of doubt, the suspect should gain 
the credit. These legal principles should also be held in the cyberspace. 
• This is a cryptographic problem because a cryptographic solution must 
be sought to support the best compromise at national and international 
levels. 
Most important of all, the solution to this problem must be trusted and 
accepted by users because their participation is paramount to the ultimate 
success of any key escrow system. 
1.3 Objectives 
This thesis proposes a new approach to the key escrow system. The crux of 
the whole issue is the mutual trust by both users and authorities. The jury 
system in common law has earned the trust of both the general public and 
authorities as an independent and impartial tribunal for settling disputes 
and it has a long history of protecting individual's civil liberty from the 
encroachment of the authorities. This thesis investigates how this implicit 
trust system can be applied to the key escrow problem. As a result, the 
objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
• Evaluate the impact of cryptography on the emerging Information Su-
perhighway. 
• Evaluate current key escrow schemes. 
• Explore the jury system and its characteristics. 
• Abstract the trust model behind the jury system. 
• Apply this trust model to the key escrow situation. 
• Illustrate how to build a secure, fair and democratic key escrow scheme 
using this model. 
• Analyse the security of this new scheme. 
• Consider some practical issues related to this new scheme. 
1.4 Scope of Study 
This thesis is mainly concerned with large-scale national and international 
key escrow systems for confidentiality purpose only and it will not discuss 
the following topics: 
• Commercial key escrow systems within the user's organization which 
serves primarily to protect against the loss of data within the organi-
zation, e.g., Nortel's Entrust or Bankers Trust. 
• Cryptographic keys for data integrity and authentication because they 
do not encrypt messages and do not interfere with law enforcement 
investigation and intelligence gathering. In fact, they tend to bind the 
source and message together and help to enforce accountability. 
1.5 Outline 
The outline of this thesis conforms very closely with the above objectives. 
Chapter 2 starts by defining privacy and then briefly describes the devel-
opment and application of cryptography to protect privacy in the emerging 
Information Superhighway. Chapter 3 highlights some problems and poten-
tial dangers with existing key escrow schemes and summarises the contribu-
tion of this thesis to solve these problems. In chapter 4, a review of some 
of the related works and their drawbacks is provided. It points out the im-
portance of mutual trust by users and authorities in these systems and leads 
to the investigation of the jury system in chapter 5. Chapter 5 briefly sum-
marises the development and features of the jury system and its similarities 
with the counterparts in continental law. Based on the trust model implicit 
in the jury system, chapter 6 proposes a new approach to key escrow by 
the introduction of "electronic jury system" and shows how to design three 
different democratic key escrow schemes. Chapter 7 evaluates the strengths 
and possible attacks of the three proposed schemes. Some counter-measures 
are proposed to prevent or minimize these attacks. Chapter 8 explores some 
practical issues related to the implementation of these schemes. Chapter 9 
draws a conclusion about democratic key escrow schemes. In the appendix, 
the source code for implementation of scheme 3 in Java language is also 
included. 
Chapter 2 
Importance of Cryptography 
and Information Superhighway 
This chapter briefly describes the development and application of cryptogra-
phy to protect privacy in the emerging Information Superhighway. 
2.1 Privacy Issue 
This section gives an informal review of the privacy issue because the pro-
tection of privacy is the central theme in this thesis. 
Privacy lies at the heart of freedom and it is the right most valued. Pri-
vacy is essentially the right to be left alone. A more comprehensive definition 
of privacy as claim or right is given by A. Westin [22]: 
Claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others. 
Privacy can be conceived roughly as a cluster of three related but inde-
pendent components [22]: 
• Secrecy: information about an individual 
• Anonymity: attention paid to an individual. 
• Solitude: access to an individual. 
A breach in any of the above components constitutes an intrusion into 
one's privacy. 
The value of privacy is associated with the following ideas [41]: 
• Personal autonomy: this means that individuals are free from interfer-
ence by authorities and they can act according to their own judgement 
and not have collective values forced upon them. 
• Self-fulfilment: it is argued that privacy provides the best conditions 
under which individuals may flourish. The dropping of the public mask, 
the communion of the intimates and the expression of the deepest emo-
tions are crucial to maintain the identity and well-being of each indi-
vidual. 
The means to maintain one's privacy include control over both one's per-
sonal life and information. Privacy is also closely implicated in the notions 
of respect and self-respect, of love, friendship, trust, freedom and protection 
of personal liberty. 
Protection of right to privacy is so fundamental that it can be found in 
many enacted laws and treaties, such as: 
• The Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution. 
• The Article 12 of the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights. 
• The Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Equally important is the privacy of commercial enterprises. Commercial 
privacy protects intellectual property, corporate secret and financial transac-
tions and it is one of the cornerstones in capitalistic economy and financial 
stability. 
In this thesis, privacy refers to both personal and commercial privacy 
without distinguishing them unless expressly stated otherwise. Likewise, 
"user" refers to individual, group or institution whose privacy is the main 
concern in this thesis. 
2.2 Development of Cryptography 
This section briefly reviews the development of cryptography and its impor-
tance to electronic communications and most of the materials in this section 
can be found in [12] and [14]. Before moving on, the following provides a 
working definition of cryptography and encryption: 
Cryptography is the art or science of keeping a message secure. It can 
be used to hide its information content, establish authenticity, prevent unde-
tected modification, prevent repudiation, and/or prevent unauthorised use. 
Encryption is a branch of cryptography that uses a mathematical algo-
rithm to scramble data in such a manner that renders it unintelligible to 
anyone who does not possess cryptographic key necessary for it and can be 
unscrambled only with the knowledge of the key. 
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography and Its Weaknesses 
Cryptography used to be the exclusive domain of government especially in 
military and diplomatic circles. However, with the advent of modern comput-
ers and communications, there has been growing commercial and academic 
interest in cryptography for civilian applications. 
In 1975, U.S. government proposed the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
for the protection of sensitive but unclassified information by government 
agencies. DES is a symmetric cryptosystem in which the same secret key 
is used to both encrypt and decrypt the message and it is now extensively 
used by the financial sector to protect financial transactions. The public 
disclosure of the DES algorithm provided inspiration for much research and 
new designs. National Security Agency (NSA) in USA has made numerous 
attempts to either stop or to control the research work by the academic 
community without success (see chapter 6 in [14]): the genie is out and it 
cannot be put back in bottle again. 
Symmetric cryptosystems suffer from the following drawbacks: 
The secret key needs to be agreed in advance of any communication. 
• It is difficult for the sender to distribute the secret key securely to the 
receiver. 
• The security lies completely in the secrecy of the secret key. Com-
promising the secret key allows anyone to decrypt the message or to 
tamper with the messages. 
• As the number n of participants increases, the number of secret keys 
required increases in the order of n^. 
• In the case of dispute, it is difficult to decide which party has cheated 
because both parties know the secret key. 
Public key cryptosystems attempt to address these problems. However, 
any public key used in public key cryptography must be properly authenti-
cated. 
2.2.2 Public key Cryptography 
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of public key which al-
lows parties to exchange encrypted data without communicating a shared 
secret key in advance. Rather than sharing a single secret key, a public key 
cryptosystem uses two keys: a public key that can be disclosed to the public 
and used to encrypt data and a corresponding private key that is kept secret 
and used to decrypt the data. Currently, RSA is the most famous and widely 
used public-key cryptosystem. 
Public key cryptography offers the following unique features: 
• Secure communication is possible without the need to share a secret 
key in advance. 
• The authenticity of a message by a sender can be verified by the re-
ceiver. 
These properties are vital for establishing large scale information infras-
tructures (e.g., electronic commerce). 
2.2.3 Importance of Cryptography 
As the volume of sensitive information flow across insecure networks is grow-
ing rapidly, strong cryptography is an essential tool for protecting users' 
privacy. 
The importance of cryptography to users includes: 
• Protection of privacy such as personal records or financial data or busi-
ness transactions from eavesdropping. 
• Protection of financial assets from sabotage, fraud, theft or commercial 
espionage of proprietary data or intellectual property. 
• Protection of stored information from unauthorised access or disclosure. 
Indeed, cryptography is critical to the development of the Information Su-
perhighway and electronic commerce. Now so much economic activities occur 
through electronic networks that restriction in deploying strong cryptography 
is dangerous. However, due to severe government control, the widespread use 
of cryptography has not materialised. 
2.3 Potential Threats of Cryptography 
This section investigates some threats of cryptography to society and users. 
In an extreme situation, abuses of cryptography may create chaos and social 
disorder known as "Crypto Anarchy". 
2.3.1 Threats 
Cryptography presents a conflict between privacy and law enforcement and 
intelligence gathering. Strong cryptography can virtually lock out all stored 
files and communications and thwart investigation by making legally inter-
cepted messages unreadable. Thus, criminals can be immune from lawful 
interception so that they can act and conspire with impunity. The use of 
cryptography seriously hampers this important law enforcement tool and 
poses a serious social threat to public safety and national security. The 
potential threats of cryptography to society include: 
• It can be used by terrorist groups to further terrorism (e.g., a plot to 
bomb a building or to assassinate a pohtical figure). 
• It can be used by criminal rings to further organized crime (e.g., extor-
tion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, child pornography, murder or money 
laundering). 
• It facilitates fraud and encourages corruption without fear of being 
discovered. 
• It can interfere with foreign intelligence operations. 
Cryptography can also be a threat to users themselves. Potential threats 
to users themselves include: 
• Lost keys by accident (e.g., by carelessness or sudden death of key-
holder). 
• Lost keys by intent (e.g., by disgruntled former employee or the key is 
held in ransom for blackmail). 
• Keys may be used to cover up fraud or espionage (e.g., by employee). 
Loss of key means that valuable data becomes inaccessible. Huge finan-
cial loss may result if the lost key cannot be recovered and the encrypted 
information will be lost forever. 
2.3.2 Crypto Anarchy 
Cryptography allows absolute freedom of communications unprecedented be-
fore in history. If cryptography is not properly harnessed, the widespread de-
ployment of cryptography may lead to social disorder and chaos. horrible 
vision of crypto anarchy in abusing cryptography is depicted in [29 . 
In crypto anarchy, it is no longer possible for governments to control 
information (e.g., to compile dossiers) and to regulate economic activities 
(e.g, collection of tax). Governments crumbled and disappeared. Instead, 
they are replaced by virtual communities of individuals doing as they wish 
without interference. 
Crypto anarchy becomes the safe havens for many criminal activities such 
as tax evasion, money laundering, espionage, contract killing and data havens 
for storing and marketing illegal material. This brings the civilization back 
to a new dark age of barbarism history never witnessed before. In Dorothy 
E. Denning's own word. 
It is like an automobile with no brakes, no seat belts, no pollution controls, 
no licence, no way of getting in after you've locked your keys in the car [12]. 
Is this desirable? Is this inevitable? 
To prevent this phenomenon from happening, the new cryptographic right 
must be properly matched by the corresponding new responsibility. 
2.4 Government Policy 
This section investigates the fundamental change in government policy in 
cryptography from strict control of use to strict access to decryption key. 
Encryption technology used to be tightly controlled by governments to 
protect public and national security. Control included export control, limit-
ing the length of the encryption key or hcensing the use. However, stringent 
control created numerous problems: 
• Strict control weakens the protection of user's privacy. 
• Strict control harms export competitiveness because the affected in-
dustry is at a disadvantage to compete globally. 
• Industry needs two sets of products for domestic and international ap-
plications and this creates extra cost and interoperability problem. 
• Strong encryption algorithms and softwares (e.g., PGP) are readily 
available in many computer sites. Strict control can only hurt most le-
gitimate users but certainly cannot prevent criminals from using them. 
Recently, there is a fundamental change in governments' policy: from 
strict control of usage in cryptography to mandatory escrowing of decryption 
key. 
To relax the use of strong encryption with long keys, an emergency de-
cryption capability by government must be provided. The most straight 
forward solution is by key archive through a trustee or key escrow authority 
appointed or licensed by the governments. 
An encrypted message normally contains a header with the session key 
encrypted under the public key of the recipient. Access is then possible using 
the escrowed private key to recover the session key and then to decrypt the 
encrypted data with the session key. 
The key archive services provided by key escrow authorities will be avail-
able to the government agencies upon court order and to the owners of the 
keys (called self-escrow). 
Although criminals might obtain encryption products from some un-
derground servers and bulletin boards or they can develop their own non-
compliant products, they have to face interoperability problem with licensed 
ones, so their use will be limited. At minimum, the key escrow system deters 
criminals from the embarrassing situation of using the convenience of the 
legitimate key management infrastructure for illegal purposes. 
2.5 Information Superhighway 
The Information Superhighway is in the making. This is possible due to the 
availability of global communication networks and strong cryptography. This 
section examines the factors and ingredients contributing to the success of 
the Information Superhighway. 
2.5.1 Cryptographic Services 
In order to effectively use the Information Superhighway, it is crucial that a 
public key system is available and a user has a reliable way of verifying the 
authenticity of public keys. 
In general, the following cryptographic services are required: 
• Authentication of users. 
• Issuing and distribution of signed certificates for public keys. 
• Revocation and expiration of public keys. 
• Time-stamping and notarization of electronic documents. 
• Resolution of disputes. 
• Private key escrow management and lawful access to private keys. 
2.5.2 Key Management Infrastructures 
Management and certification of public keys can be performed by a certifica-
tion authority while maintaining private key archives is done by a key escrow 
authority (or a trustee) though they can be combined together. 
The certification authority establishes proof of identity of the person own-
ing the corresponding private key and then signs a certificate containing the 
user's public key. A certificate for a public encryption key will not be issued 
unless the corresponding private decryption key is archived by the key es-
crow authority. The certificate can be used to verify user's public key over a 
network. Separate keys can be used for encryption (for confidentiality) and 
digital signature (for authentication and nonrepudiation) and separate cer-
tificates will be issued for each key. With the help of a certification authority, 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and nonrepudiation cryptographic ser-
vices can be provided. A hierarchy or network of certificate authorities can 
be established to form an infrastructure for managing and certifying public 
keys. 
Such a key management infrastructure can be extended to form a national 
and global Information Infrastructure (Nil and GII). With a key escrow fa-
cility, the Information Superhighway will not become a safe haven for illegal 
activities. A global key management infrastructure with key escrow facil-
ity also requires international agreements. Thus, government initiative and 
involvement is critical to make Nil and GII a reality. 
Users can then access strong and globally interoperable encryption sys-
tems and key management services. 
As certification authorities and key escrow authorities play crucial roles 
in Nil and GII, strict standards must be developed by legislation to ensure 
key integrity, confidentiality, accessibility, auditability, recovery and use. In 
particular, key escrow authorities must ensure the following: 
• Authorised access is possible in a timely fashion. 
• Proper access procedures and legal operational safeguards are strictly 
followed. 
• Proper audit records of key handling events are kept. 
• A high level of assurance that there is no unlawful compromise or abuse 
of escrowed keys. 
Some early suggestions of key escrow authorities included post office, bank 
or clerks of the Federal Courts [7]. In general, they should be certified or 
accredited according to their qualification, responsibility, liability and be in 
the private sector rather than the government agencies. 
From the security point of view, it is desirable to split the keys into a 
number of shares and each share can be escrowed by a separate key escrow 
authority so that the keys cannot be misused without collusion. 
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Chapter 3 
Challenge 
This chapter briefly highlights some problems and potential dangers with 
existing key escrow schemes and summarises the objectives of this thesis. 
3.1 Problems with Existing Key Escrow Schemes 
Existing large-scale key escrow schemes have numerous conceptual and tech-
nical problems. Typical problems are: 
• It is mandatory for users to hand over their private keys to a key 
escrow authority as a prerequisite to certification of their public keys 
by a certification authority. This is analogous to assuming everyone is 
guilty until proven innocent which nurtures fear in being wire-tapped 
at any moment and this may create a chilling effect in communication 
• Government may suddenly become malicious: for example in the case 
that a dictator gains power, by changing the escrow policy overnight, 
the government can then start massive recovery of the escrowed keys 
and embark upon mass wire-tapping. 
• Trustees are the weak link of the system: they can be easily attacked 
because they are well-known and their number is small. 
• If the key escrow database is compromised, the security is lost. Every 
user of that key escrow authority can then be eavesdropped electroni-
cally. 
• Users do not have confidence in these schemes because they are in 
favour of law enforcement agencies at the price of sacrificing users' 
right of privacy. 
Hence, under existing schemes, users are completely unprotected from the 
abuse of power by authorities or compromise of the security in the system 
yet they have no other options but to faithfully and unconditionally trust 
that the system will work properly for them. 
3.2 Orwellian World 
The government is powerful while the individual is weak. In its attempt 
to ensure the safety of its citizens, the government can easily overstep the 
privacy of the individuals. Increasingly more activities (political, social, cul-
tural, financial) are occurring electronically, too much government control 
can result serious erosion of the rights of privacy. 
The following is an abstract taken from George Orwell's 1984 which de-
picted the horrible scene of complete intrusion of individual's privacy by the 
government: 
Outside, even through the shut window-pane, the world looked cold. Down 
in the street little eddies of wind were whirling dust and torn paper into spi-
rals, and though the sun was shining and the sky a harsh blue, there seemed 
to be no colour in anything, except the posters that were plastered everywhere. 
The black-moustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding corner. 
There was one on the house-front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER 
IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said, while the dark eyes looked deep into 
Winston's own. Down at street level another poster, torn at one corner, 
flapped fitfully in the wind, alternately covering and uncovering the single 
word INGSIC. In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the 
roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a 
curving flight. It was the police patrol, snooping into people's windows. The 
patrols did not matter, however. Only the Thought Police mattered. Behind 
Winston's back the voice from the telescreen was still babbling away about 
pig-iron and the overfulfilment of the Ninth Three-Year Plan. The telescreen 
received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, 
above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so 
long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque com-
manded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of 
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, 
or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was 
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. 
But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You 
had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct - in the assumption 
that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every 
movement scrutinized [34]-
This vision of a Big Brother government should serve as a warning to the 
design and choice of any key escrow schemes. 
3.3 Dilemma 
Strong encryption enables absolute privacy of communication with the po-
tential of denying legitimate government access. This is unprecedented and 
not available in other areas of civilized lives, for example, one's speech is 
subject to slander, libel, obscenity and other legal restraints. Human society 
is based on an implicit social contract: individuals sacrifice absolute freedom 
in exchange for an orderly society and limited freedom. One must protect 
privacy as well as public safety and national security. Cryptography has up-
set the traditional balance of power between individuals and government. A 
new balance must be sought to restore the status quo. 
This involves balancing competing interests in a way that ensures effective 
law enforcement and intelligence gathering, while protecting users' privacy. 
To sum up this dilemma, Dorothy E. Denning wrote a letter [13] and it 
is reproduced here as follows: 
My position on encryption policy, April 2, 1997. 
I do not know what is the best long-term U.S. or international policy regarding 
encryption. I recognize the need for encryption to protect information, but I 
also appreciate the adverse effects encryption can have on public safety, law 
enforcement, and national security. 
I do not advocate domestic regulations mandating key recovery. Neither 
do I advocate that cryptography necessarily be free of all regulation, including 
export controls. I constantly struggle with the issues and do not see easy 
answers. I believe that we should seriously discuss and evaluate a wide range 
of options, and that our decisions should be as informed as possible. There 
may not be a single approach that is best in all contexts. 
I believe that organizations and individuals should be able to use strong, 
robust encryption. I also believe that key recovery is good business policy. 
I support the program of the Clinton Administration to liberalize export 
controls for key recovery products, to adopt key recovery within federal agen-
cies, and to promote key recovery technologies. I believe that key recovery 
can be done without compromising privacy and security. 
I support open, public discussions of encryption policy. I also recognize 
that pertinent information relating to national security, law enforcement, and 
proprietary interests will not be made public. Encryption policy must be based 
on all available information. 
Dorothy E. Denning 
This dilemma of electronic privacy versus lawful access by government 
may in extreme cases create crypto anarchy or the Big Brother world. The 
paramount question in this thesis is: is there a middle ground or compromise 
between users and authorities that is mutually acceptable to and trusted by 
both parties? 
3.4 This Work 
This thesis proposes an optimal solution to this intractable dilemma based 
on the jury system and presents an improved key escrow scheme that is 
acceptable to all parties. This scheme has the following properties: 
• The government cannot embark upon mass wire-tapping. 
• The number of trustees is so large that it is practically infeasible to 
manipulate them. 
• Even if the key escrow database is compromised, the escrowed keys are 
still safe. 
• Users' private keys are not handed over to the authorities prematurely 
until they are actually alleged of committing a crime. 
• This scheme provides a fair balance of power between users and au-
thorities. It balances the user's right of privacy without sacrificing the 
need for law enforcement. 
These properties are achieved by retaining the bulk of the escrowed keys 
in the hands of the users themselves (conceptually) until the moment they 
are required for law enforcement purposes. 
Chapter 4 
Related Works 
This chapter briefly reviews some of the related works. A taxonomy for key 
escrow systems can also be found in [10]. Most of these schemes suffer from 
the drawbacks as pointed out in section 3.1. 
4.1 Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 
After over twenty years of service, DES was believed to be close to the end 
of its useful life. A stronger algorithm with longer key is needed to replace 
DES. On April 16, 1993, the U.S. Government announced [33] a proposal for 
a new federal standard encryption system with key escrow capability which 
is called Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) [23'. 
4.1.1 Brief Description of EES 
EES is a voluntary Federal standard for encryption of voice, fax and computer 
information transmitted over circuit-switched telephone systems. It is based 
on a tamperproof chip (also known as CHpper chip) which implements the 
classified Skipjack encryption algorithm designed by the National Security 
Agency (NSA). Skipjack is a symmetric block cipher with a key length of 80 
bits which is much stronger than DES with 56 bits. Both the plaintext and 
ciphertext lengths are 64 bits. 
In EES, a user's Clipper chip key is escrowed with two government escrow 
agents (namely, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and Au-
tomated Systems Division of the Treasury Department) and hence allows key 
recovery by law enforcement authorities when served with a lawful warrant. 
To identify the sender and receiver, a field, called Law Enforcement Agency 
Field (LEAF) is attached to the ciphertext. An excellent account of EES can 
be found in [IT 
4.1.2 Operation 
For two parties to communicate using EES, both parties must have a com-
munication security device with a Clipper chip. Every chip will have its chip 
identifier and key registered with the Federal government. Key registration 
will occur during manufacturing process and NSA licences the manufacturers 
of the chip. The protocol is as follows: 
• The devices agree on an 80-bit session key separately (not included in 
EES). 
• Each device passes the session key to its Clipper chip. 
• Clipper chip encrypts the session key with its chip key. 
• The encrypted session key and the chip's 32-bit identifier together with 
a 16-bit checksum are encrypted again by the family key known to the 
government only and this forms the LEAF that is transmitted to the 
other device. 
• If the LEAF is valid, encrypted communications can begin. 
Recovery by law enforcement agencies such as Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) is as follows: 
• FBI intercepts the encrypted message. 
• FBI extracts the LEAF from the header of the message. 
• LEAF is decrypted by using the family key and the chip's identifier is 
determined. 
• Escrow agents return the two halves of the corresponding chip's key. 
• The session key can be recovered by decrypting again with this chip 
key. 
• The plaintext can be recovered by decrypting with this session key. 
Note that, once the chip key is obtained, all encrypted calls made using 
this chip can be similarly decrypted without time-bound. 
4.1.3 Criticism 
Public response to EES has been overwhelmingly negative and it has sparked 
off a lot of criticisms. Criticisms include: 
• Skipjack algorithm is classified and not open to public scrutiny. 
• Because Skipjack is designed by NSA (a military organization), there 
is a suspicion that a backdoor might have been installed. 
• EES requires inflexible and special tamper-proof hardware. 
• User's secret keys are escrowed by government agencies and this allows 
ease of collusion and unlawful wiretapping of private communications 
of the users. 
• There is fear that there will be a total ban by government in unescrowed 
encryption systems. 
• There is no self-escrow facility and hence it offers no benefit to the users 
because users of lost key cannot use EES to recover their lost keys. 
• Although the exact method of checksum is classified, the 16 bits check-
sum is too small to be secure against exhaustive search. 
• Once an investigation is authorized by the court, the authority will be 
able to decrypt every message transmitted by the suspect, without any 
time-bound. 
• Only information about a message sender is included in the LEAF. One 
cannot trace the destination of a message. 
• It requires a limited number of licensed EES manufacturers to produce 
the Clipper chips and security is a problem. 
• EES adds complexity and cost to the communication system. 
• It is unlikely that foreign countries will adopt Clipper chip for secure 
communications. 
• Interoperability problem between two different systems requires dual 
products to support domestic and overseas applications. 
One security attack comes from the work of Blaze [5]. He pointed out that 
it is possible for rogue applications to use the Skipjack algorithm integrated 
inside a Clipper chip to do encryption/decryption without using the LEAF. 
This technique replaces the LEAF containing the current session key by one 
containing an unrelated key that allows one participant in a communication 
to construct unilaterally a LEAF that denies law enforcement, but which will 
be accepted as "valid" by a communicant using EES-compliant technology. 
Some more technical criticisms can also be found in [24 . 
4.1.4 Clipper II & III 
In the Clipper chip II scheme, the U.S. government recognized the importance 
of independent trustees and agreed to use trusted third parties (TTP) outside 
the government to escrow users' private keys but still refused to unclassify 
the Skipjack algorithm. However, Clipper II was soon replaced by a more 
open and comprehensive proposal [32] in May 1996 which was soon dubbed 
as "Clipper III". 
4.2 Fair Public Key Cryptosystems 
This is an important scheme which was proposed by Micali in 1992 [28j and 
was partially adopted by Clipper III. In this scheme, there are a fixed number 
of predesignated trustees and there exists an arbitrary number of users. A 
user chooses his/her public and private key pair and then splits the private 
key into pieces and gives each trustee one piece. Each trustee can individually 
verify that the piece he/she received is indeed part of the private key without 
combining the pieces. Unlike EES, there is no need for a tamperproof chip 
and a classified algorithm. The scheme is based on pubhc key cryptosystems 
and can be implemented in software alone. 
The contribution of this paper includes: 
• It introduces a software-based public-key key escrow scheme. 
• This scheme is fairer to the users because it strikes a better balance of 
power between users and authorities in comparison with EES. 
• Different schemes for both RSA and Diffie-Hellman based systems are 
proposed. 
• It incorporates verifiable secret sharing protocol so that the user can 
choose his/her key but he/she cannot cheat the trustees. 
• It discusses algorithmic-chosen session key generation. 
• It discusses time-bounded court-authorized eavesdropping. 
However, this scheme suffers from the drawbacks mentioned in section 
3.1. Later on, this thesis will show how to make this scheme democratic. 
4.3 Encapsulated Key Escrow 
This scheme [1] improves [28] and makes it possible for authorities to only 
selectively wiretap a small number of individual users but makes it compu-
tationally prohibitive to launch large scale wiretapping. This is achieved by 
imposing a computational time delay (or time capsule) between obtaining of 
the escrowed information of a user and recovering the user's private key. The 
time capsule can be set arbitrarily depending on the computational strength 
of the authorities. 
In this scheme, it is true that massive recovery of private keys by the 
government is computationally hard, but some problems can still be noticed: 
• There is no concrete construction of the time capsule function is given 
and it is difficult to assess the strength of such a function. 
• Even the time capsule can be found, it is difficult to set the time capsule 
correctly because the government's computational strength is not static 
but highly dynamic (e.g., due to technological breakthrough). This may 
create worries and frequent re-escrowing by users. 
• If the time capsule is set too high, it may create too much delay to the 
law enforcement agencies to render it useless after the key is recovered. 
4.4 Verifiable Partial Key Ecsrow 
In this scheme [2] only part of the private key of a user is escrowed in a verifi-
able manner with the trustees of the government and it does not suffer from 
early recovery attacks. Even if the government obtains legal authorization 
for wiretapping the user and gets hold of the part of the private key which 
was escrowed, it will still need to compute for a non-negligible but feasible 
time, before it can recover the entire private key. This prevents the govern-
ment from embarking upon large scale wiretapping. This scheme is similar 
to [1] and shares similar problems with the other scheme. 
4.5 A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third 
Party Services 
This scheme [31] is adopted by the UK government for secure email and it is 
based on Diffie-Hellman's key distribution protocol. It introduces a licensed 
trusted third party (TTP) to escrow users' private keys. 
In this scheme, consider a pair of users A and B where A wishes to send 
B a confidential message and needs to be provided with a session key to 
protect it. Suppose that A and B have associated different TTPs TA and 
TB respectively. TA and TB need to agree on a number of parameters during 
the setup phase. 
Prior to any communication, A needs to generate the private send key 
and obtain the public receive key for B and B needs to have the private 
receive key. These keys are unique for each pair of participants A and B. 
There are numerous problems with this scheme [30]. One serious problem 
(Problem 6 on p.9) is that the compromise of the interoperability key between 
the two domains will be catastrophic, as all traffic between users in those 
domains will be vulnerable to attack. 
4.6 Oblivious Key Escrow 
In this scheme [6], the Internet as a whole acts as an escrow agent. This 
is made possible by splitting the key into a very large number of shares 
(e.g., 5000). These shares are then escrowed randomly by different sites 
independently in such a manner that no one knows which sites are escrowing 
whose keys. The trustees are very decentralised and their number is huge. 
This scheme gets rid of many concerns associated with conventional schemes 
but there are some problems : 
• It is extremely inefficient and requires a lot of memory for a large-scale 
system because each key has to be spht into a large number of shares. 
• It is very chaotic and unreliable (e.g., the identities of shareholders are 
not known). 
• It is difficult for lawful recovery of the escrowed key (the author sug-
gested pleading the case in television in order to convince these sites 
to return their shares). 
• It lacks structure and details for a serious implementation. 
• It cannot prevent a malicious user from cheating by escrowing some 
random bits rather than his/her true private key. 
4.7 Translucent Cryptography 
This scheme [3] offers an alternative to key escrow and does not require key 
escrow trustees at all. It was proposed that a probability can be used as a 
parameter such that a particular intercepted message can be decrypted by 
law enforcement agencies with this probabiHty. However, it has two serious 
disadvantages: 
• Law enforcement may be frustrated because when it has an authorised 
wiretap, it is not getting decryption of all the messages. 
• Individuals may be frustrated that this scheme does not provide abso-
lute privacy for their messages; law enforcement can read some fraction 
of their messages. 
Hence, this scheme should not be used for sending sensitive information. 
4.8 Binding Cryptography 
This scheme [20] is another alternative to key-escrow schemes and it allows 
data recovery by law enforcement agencies as before. Data recovery is possi-
ble without the need to recover the private key. It avoids the need to escrow 
the private key by the concept of "binding data". In this scheme, users' 
messages should consist of the following fields: 
• The intended message encrypted with a symmetric system by using a 
session key. 
• The session key encrypted by the public key of the receiver so that it 
can be recovered by the receiver only. 
• The session key encrypted by the public key of a trustee so that it can 
be recovered by the trustee only. 
It is essential to prove that the two encrypted fields correspond to the 
same session key without disclosing it. An efficient implementation based on 
ElGamal encryption scheme [19] is also proposed. In case of lawful data re-
covery, the trustee only needs to decrypt the session key with his/her private 
key. In this manner, this scheme gets rid of the problem of escrowing user's 
private key altogether. However, it shares the same problem with [31]: the 
potential risk of compromising the trustee's key. In addition, the last field 
is redundant and it is not necessary for secure communication between two 
parties. Hence, it is difficult to enforce illegal users from omitting it unless 
all communication providers cooperate to prevent this from happening. 
4.9 A Mat t e r of Trust 
The ultimate problem with existing key escrow schemes is a matter of trust. 
Without user's trust, key escrow systems cannot become widespread as the 
governments would Hke to see. The failure of Clipper chip initiative clearly 
supports this point. Realising this problem of trust, governments now agree 
to use TTP as escrow agents. While this is a drastic improvement in boosting 
confidence among users, the revised schemes are still insecure, unfair and 
undemocratic. The old problem remains: whom can the users trust? Can 
they trust a handful of trustees appointed and regulated by the governments? 
Perhaps, the real solution does not lie in inventing new cryptographic 
technology alone but also in finding the new delicate balance point between 
users' and authorities' rights which must be mutually trusted by both parties. 
However, a measure of trust is something which is difficult to establish or to 
maintain. 
The jury system in common law has a high reputation of being impartial, 
independent and representative. It has been implicitly trusted by individuals 
and authorities alike as a tribunal for settling disputes over several hundreds 
of years. The impHcit trust model in the jury system may have modern 
relevance to key escrow scheme today. 
Chapter 5 
Jury System 
The jury system provides impartial administration of justice to protect in-
dividuals' civil liberty. It allows lay participation by individuals and this 
can be used to express the community conscience through its members of 
the jury. The concept of lay participation and community conscience is the 
most crucial part of the jury system. This chapter briefly summarises the 
development and features of the jury system and its similarities with the 
counterparts in continental law. Most of the materials in this chapter can be 
found in [9] and [18 
5.1 Introduction 
There are broadly two kinds of justice systems in criminal trials in the world : 
common law system (also known as adversary system) and continental system 
(also known as inquisitorial system). The former one is mainly practised by 
English speaking countries such as Britain and USA while the latter is typical 
of European countries such as France and Germany. The adversary system 
relies mainly on oral argument and presentation while the inquisitorial system 
concentrates more on written evidence. In both trial systems, a suspect is 
assumed innocent until proven guilty. 
Crime in the common law system can be classified into two types - sum-
mary offences and indictable ofl"ences. The first category of offences are 
mainly minor offences and not criminal in the full sense (e.g., driving of-
fences which can be mostly settled by fines) so that it is not worthwhile to 
undergo prolonged trial by jury. In case of indictable offences (e.g., murder 
cases which normally impose severe imprisonment sentences), the accused 
has a right to trial by jury. Trial by jury is of utmost importance in criminal 
trial of common law system. It is conducted in a fashion similar to a contest 
between prosecution and defence lawyers and the prosecution must prove to 
the jury's satisfaction that the suspect is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 
The role of the judge is to act as an umpire in order to make sure both sides 
act properly according to the prescribed rules. 
The origins of trial by jury is deeply rooted in the political struggles of 
medie\'al England. It is not what some lawgiver so decreed but evolved grad-
ually over several hundreds years. By this system, twelve men and women 
are selected at random from a large population of jurors chosen from the 
common folks to form a jury in a criminal trial; they have never before had 
any judicial experience. Their role is to judge the facts presented to them. 
At the end of the case they will deliberate in order to arrive at a verdict of 
whether the accused is guilty or not. The jury are free to reach whatever 
verdict seems just, taking the case as a whole. It is not required that the 
jurors have to understand all directions given by the judge; they deliberate 
secretly; they need not give explanations for their verdict. They are therefore 
free from strict application of the law to the facts and this gives them some 
flexibility in applying the law. 
5.2 Origin 
Originally a juror was just a man who was compelled by the King to take 
an oath in telling the truth. The Normans brought over this idea of jury 
to Britain during the Norman Conquest. Subsequently, the King used it 
for obtaining information which he wanted to know about matters of local 
administration. People living in the place where an inquiry was being held 
were compelled to answer because they must know the local facts. Thus the 
jury originated as a body of men used in an inquest decreed by the King. At 
the beginning, the inquest was not related to the administration of justice. 
Disputes were settled simply by one of the disputants proving himself by 
some means to be the better man, e.g., trial by battle. However, trial by 
ordeal was the most popular way to settle a dispute because people at that 
time believed that it represented the divine acceptance of a claim by the 
claimant. 
5.3 Early History 
A jury which gave the King information for administrative purposes was later 
used by King Henry II to give information which would enable him to decide 
a dispute. When a party got twelve oaths from the jury in his favour, he 
won. This is the origin of the trial jury, of the rule that the trial jury consists 
of twelve and of the rule that the verdict must be unanimous. Twelve was 
chosen because it was thought to be large enough to create favourable opinion 
of the side that won. 
In November 1215 Pope Innocent III prohibited trial by ordeal which was 
practised in criminal trials for more than fifty years because it was thought 
to be too cruel. As a result, new ways must be invented and it was at this 
moment that judges started to use the jury for criminal trials. Gradually, the 
role of jury changed from providing local knowledge in an inquest to the sole 
adjudicators of facts in modern jury system. This was due to the fact that 
courts in feudal society required local knowledge of jurors for the settlement 
of disputes. Due urbanization, this was no longer possible. Jurors, instead 
of deciding the case on what they themselves knew, rehed on the submitted 
evidence provided by both parties to reach the verdict. 
Bushells Case in 1670 was a landmark in the history of jury system be-
cause it ended the judge's power to force juries to convict a suspect, by 
threatening to punish them if they did not comply. In that case, the Quakes, 
Penn and Mead, were set free by the jury of participating in an unlawful 
assembly and the trial judge subsequently put the jury in jail. However, the 
whole body of judges gathered together and concluded that as a matter of 
law the trial judge did not have any power to do this. The case is often hailed 
as a triumph for the independence of juries. 
5.4 Characteristics 
The following are the main characteristics of the jury system: 
• The composition of jurors should be representative of the community 
at large. 
• The juror represents the reasonable man or the man in the street. 
• The juror should be a freeman. Most civil servants are exempt from 
jury service. 
• The jurors are not responsible for anything said or done in carrying out 
of their duty. 
• The jury is the sole judge of facts. 
• Twelve jurors are randomly selected from the juror population to form 
a jury in a criminal trial. 
• The jury has only to return yes or no without any need to give any 
reasons. 
• In most cases, ten-to-two majority verdict is sufficient. In rare cases, 
unanimity is required. 
5.5 Selection Procedure 
The selection of a jury is done in two stages. The first stage is the selection of 
a small subset of jurors from the juror population by the sheriff. The second 
stage is the selection of twelve jurors from the subset to form the jury and 
that is done by the clerk of the court randomly. A juror can be challenged 
either peremptorily or for cause. The peremptory challenge is the one for 
which no reason need to be assigned and the number is now limited to seven. 
The party challenging for cause must show grounds to support the challenge. 
The challenged juror cannot serve in that trial and must be replaced by other 
jurors. 
5.6 Merits 
The Jury system presents an image of independence, impartiality and rep-
resentativeness. The jurors are selected randomly from citizens who have 
no conflict of interest in the case, their judgement is unbiased by the legal 
and administrative bureaucracy (e.g., courts and police). Thus, it convinces 
members of society to accept the impartial nature of the judicial institutions. 
In summary, the merits are : 
• The jurors prevent collusion between judges and the police, and prevent 
police influence in the courts from becoming dominant. 
• The jurors prevent private citizens from exerting improper influence 
over judges (e.g., by bribery). 
• The jurors prevent the state from manipulating justice to curb its po-
litical opponents. 
• The jurors prevent unjustifiable prosecutions and safeguard against re-
pugnant laws which are harsh and oppressive. 
• The jurors act as adjudicators whose view and experience will be those 
of the man-in-the-street. 
• The jurors are free from prejudice of professional judges and prevent 
judges from imposing the views from their social class. 
• The jurors ensure the independence and quality of the judges. 
• The jury system educates the jurors with a sense of fairness and pro-
priety of the judicial processes. 
In 1768, William Blackstone enshrined the jury as the palladium, the 
bulwark of liberty [4]. In USA and Canada, the jury system is generally 
acclaimed as a fundamental guarantee of individual liberty. Trial by jury 
is therefore enshrined as a constitutional right (the Six Amendment of U.S. 
Constitution and the Canadian Bill of Rights). 
5.7 Trials in Continental Law 
Many countries practising continental law employ a system in which judges 
and laymen sit together as a combined bench to decide a criminal case. Below 
are just a few examples: 
• France : seven laymen (also called jurors) are required to sit together 
with three judges as one bench to decide questions of guilt and punish-
ment jointly. 
• Germany : a court of six lay members and three judges is established 
to try the most serious criminal offences, and for the medium-range 
offences a smaller version comprising one judge and two laymen is cre-
ated. 
• Sweden : in serious crime, a professional judge and from seven to nine 
lay members known as "namndeman" form a panel. These are drawn 
from a large body of local citizens chosen for their position of respon-
sibility and their record of service in the community. The judge acts 
as chairman and his/her vote is given special weight. A case can only 
go against his/her opinion if at least seven of the lay members decide 
it the other way. For the middle range of crimes, a judge and three 
namndeman is used. 
Here the judge has greater influence over the lay members by taking part 
in the joint deliberations (in common law, jury deliberates alone). However, 
the judge has to justify his/her opinion to the laymen, for they in the end 
have the power to outvote him. Thus, the presence of lay judges, being totally 
independent, offers advantages similar to the common law's jury system. 
5.8 Bulwark of Civil Liberty 
The jury system is often hailed as the bulwark of civil Hberty. Below are just 
a few famous quotations from legal sources to support this view: 
• no free man shall be taken and imprisoned or disseised of any free 
tenement or of his liberties or free customs or outlawed or exiled, or 
in any other way destroyed, nor will we go upon nor send upon him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land [8]. 
• The first object of any tyrant in Whithall would be to make Parliament 
utterly subservient to his will; and the next to overthrow or diminish 
trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject^s freedom in the 
hands of twelve of his country-men. So that trial by jury is more than 
an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: 
it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives [15]. 
• What makes juries worthwhile is that they see things differently from 
the judges, that they can water the law, and that function which they 
filled two centuries ago as a corrective to the corruption and partiality 
of the judges requires essentially the same qualities as the function they 
perform today as an organ of the disestablishment [17]. 
In a democracy law is made by the mil of the people and obedience 
is given to it not primarily out of fear but from goodwill. But just 
as important as the frame of the law is its application. The jury is the 
means by which the people play a direct part in the application of law. It 
is a contributory part. The interrelation between judge and jury, slowly 
and carefully worried out over several hundred years, secures that the 
verdict will not be demagogic: it will not be simply uninhibited popular 
reaction. But it also secures that the law will not be applied in a way 
that affronts the conscience of the common man. Constitutionally it is 
an invaluable achievement that popular consent should be at the root 
not only of the making but also the application of the law. It is one of 
the significant causes of our political stability [16]. 
Chapter 6 
Democratic Key Escrow 
Schemes 
In the following, this thesis proposes a new approach to key escrow by the 
introduction of "electronic jury system". 
6.1 Electronic Jury System 
The jury system represents the middle ground or compromise in the tradi-
tional balance of power between individuals and the government and this 
trusted compromise is exactly what is lacking in the existing key escrow sys-
tems. The implicit trust model can be borrowed and applied in this new 
situation of key escrow system. 
6.1.1 New Mechanism 
The proposed electronic jury system is a new mechanism to achieve proper 
balance of power in the new era of information revolution by distributing the 
escrowed key shares to users who are members of the electronic jury rather 
than the authorities. The selection of electronic jurors and electronic jury 
must be fair and seen to be fair. Each escrowed key is kept collectively by the 
electronic jury using a secret sharing scheme [38]. The specific combination of 
the electronic jury should be kept secret and known to the authorities alone. 
In the case of an alleged crime, the authorities will request the electronic 
jury to return their shares of the suspect's private key in order to recover 
his/her private key. Optionally, it may be required that the authorities have 
to submit the case to the electronic jury and to convince them for the return 
of their shares. Each electronic juror may decide individually or together. If 
the number of shares exceed the threshold, the authorities can recover the 
private key and decrypt the necessary information. 
One distinct advantage of this scheme is that it allows a better interna-
tional agreement in establishing a global key escrow infrastructure because 
there is a common thread in using laymen in the judicial process in both 
common law and continental law. 
In the remaining parts of the thesis, jury/juror are not distinguished from 
electronic jury/juror. This can be easily understood from the context. 
6.1.2 Abs t rac t Model for Electronic Ju ry System 
Based on the traditional jury system, the following abstract model can be 
established: 
• The jurors must be chosen fairly from the users to form the juror pop-
ulation. 
• The juror population must be large enough to prevent possible manip-
ulation of jurors. 
• A jury consisting of a small number of jurors (say seven) must be 
randomly selected from the juror population by escrow authority. 
• Each user's private key is then shared among the jurors in the jury. 
• Each user should not know his/her jury to prevent collusion. 
• Each juror must not know the user for the same reason. 
• The actual secret key shares must not be known to escrow authority to 
prevent compromise or abuse by authorities. 
• The list of jury population must be public to foster openness and trust. 
• The key escrow information (the mapping of users to juries) is known 
to the escrow authority only in order to allow lawful recovery of private 
keys. 
Optionally, jury can be used to evaluate police's request (e.g., by requiring 
a brief summary of the case) and vote by returning/not returning individual 
shares. 
Further benefits are the same as traditional jury system mentioned in 
Section 10.6. 
6.2 System Description 
A key escrow scheme is democratic if it employs the above electronic jury 
system as key escrow trustees. It is democratic because the traditional jury 
system is one of the cornerstones of modern democracy. 
This section shows how to design democratic key escrow schemes. Three 
different schemes are then proposed in the following three sections. Each 
scheme prevents a. user from cheating: that is escrowing some random bits 
rather than his/her true private key. The first one attempts to solve this 
problem by using a tamperproof smart card while the second and third ones 
do the same but eliminate the need for special hardware and can be fully 
implemented in software. 
6.2.1 Entities 
The system consists of the following entities: 
• User: the user wants to (or is required to) escrow his/her private key. 
• Escrow authority (EA): EA stores the information about each user's 
private key but does not actually store the private key. Instead, EA 
only needs to know the jury who actually hold the shares of a given 
user. 
• Certification Authority (CA): CA signs user's public key and binds 
user's identity to his/her public key. To obtain such a certificate, the 
user needs to escrow his/her private key with EA beforehand. 
• Legal authority (LA): LA is responsible for registration, selection and 
maintenance of juror population. LA is also responsible for recovering 
user's private key. 
• Law enforcement authority (LEA): LEA wants to wire-tap a suspect's 
encrypted message. LEA will need to seek help from LA. 
• Juror: a juror is selected from the pool of users themselves according 
to some known criteria. Each juror independently escrows user's shares 
of his/her private key. The juror population is publicly known and the 
population size is large. 
• Jury: a jury is a body of jurors (say 7 members) randomly selected 
from the juror population. Each jury is responsible for escrowing one 
private key according to a secret sharing scheme. 
6.2.2 Requirements 
A democratic scheme must have the following properties: 
1. It must allow the user to securely choose his/her private key. 
2. EA must be convinced that the escrowed private key is correct and not 
just some random bits: yet. EA cannot learn anything about the private 
key. EA also hats to ensure that the escrowed private key correctly 
matches user's public key. 
3. User must be prevented from learning who his/her jurors are and the 
jurors must not learn who the user is. 
The first property prevents the authorities from selecting a weak key for 
the user. 
The second property requires either employing a tamperproof smart card, 
a verifiable secret sharing scheme or a "cut-and-choose" protocol to be dis-
cussed below. 
The third property can be achieved by dis-allowing direct communications 
between the user and the jury so that all communications are routed through 
EA. However. EA w îll then know the private key too. One solution is to 
allow each juror to send an encryption key to the user through EA so that 
the user can encrypt his/her share with this key for this juror. This share 
is then forwarded to the juror through EA and the juror can then decrypt 
the message with his/her secret decryption key to recover the share. By this 
way, the user can send the shares to the jurors securely without EA learning 
the escrowed key. However, EA can cheat by secretly creating a pair of keys 
itself. EA then gives one of them to the user and pretends that the key 
comes from the juror. User will then encrypt juror's share using this key. 
This enables EA to recover user's secret key easily after obtaining enough 
shares. This can be prevented by allowing the user to challenge the jury. A 
challenged jury will be opened by EA and become known to the user and 
the user can then check with the jury whether EA has cheated by verifying 
the encryption key. The challenged jury will then be replaced by a new one 
by repeating the key registration scheme again. More information about the 
security of this mechanism can be found in 4 of section 7.2. 
It is assumed that all communication channels are secure. This may be 
easily achieved by sharing a secret key in advance by the participants who 
need to communicate directly. 
6.3 Scheme 1 
This scheme employs a tamperproof smart card for secure key generation 
and storage to prevent the user from cheating. It presumes the availabihty 
of such a trusted hardware device with some cryptographic capabilities. 
6.3.1 Key Registration 
Let M be the number of jurors in each jury per user. 
1. User requests key escrow service from EA. 
2. While User is not satisfied with the jurors selected by EA, repeat the 
following steps: 
3. EA randomly selects M jurors from the juror population provided by 
LA to form a jury. 
4. EA calls the M selected jurors. 
5. Each juror 2, z = 1 , . . . , M", does the following: 
• Generates two primes pî  Qi and computes a modulus ni = p̂  * qi. 
• Chooses Ki^i,K2,i such that: 
Ki^i * 1x2,i = 1 mod [pi - - 1). 
• Sends Ki^i,ni to EA but keeps pi^qi secret. 
6. EA sends all . . . , KI^MI ^i, • • •, '^m to User. 
7. User challenges the jury or exits the while loop from here if he/she 
accepts this jury selected by EA to escrow his/her shares. 
8. EA opens the jury to User and public. 
9. User checks that is indeed sent by juror i. 
10. End of while loop 
11. User's smart card generates one key pair {pk,sk) for RSA. 
12. EA randomly generates a mask m which is a random number used to 
hide the private key of the user. 
13. EA does the following: 
• Notifies the user to insert the smart card. 
• Authenticates user's smart card and verifies the key pair is correct. 
• Sends all . . . , KI^M, ^i, • • •, ̂ M and m to the smart card. 
14. The smart card does the following: 
• XORs sk with m to produce skm. That is, skm = sk m. 
• Splits skm into M shares SI,....SM using Shamir's threshold 
scheme. The share Si is intended for juror i. 
• Encrypts each share of skm for the juror i with his/her corre-
sponding Ki^i. Let the result be denoted by Ŝ . That is, = 
EK,.. is.). 
• Sends 5 i , . . . , SM to EA. 
15. EA sends 5 i , . . . , SM to the jurors 1,. •., M. 
16. Juror i does the following: 
• Decrypts Si with /\2,i to recover his/her share. That is, 
== DK2,^ (Si). 
• Stores his/her share. 
17. EA accepts the registration. 
18. CA publishes the user's pk. 
6.3.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 
1. LEA presents the case to LA. 
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject the claim. 
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jury through EA. EA 
will also send the mask m to LA. 
4. Each juror i returns his/her share Si to LA. 
5. If the number of received shares exceeds the threshold, LA can recover 
the XORed private key skm. 
6. LA XORs the mask m to recover the private key sk. 
The shares are returned directly to LA in order to prevent EA from knowing 
the private key of the suspect (EA does not need it). 
6.3.3 Efficiency Consideration 
This scheme requires a lot of computations but they are distributed in such 
a way that makes it feasible in practice. Below is a breakdown of the com-
putation for each party : 
• User's smart card needs to prepare one key pair, XORs the private 
key with the mask and splits the result into M shares. It also has to 
encrypt M times using jurors' keys. User then only has to wait for 
EA's notice for acceptance. Typically, M is a small integer (say 7). 
Computation is not excessive because a user needs to register his/her 
private key occasionally and non-interactively. Hence, efficiency is not 
a critical issue. 
• EA needs to generate one mask. Also, EA needs to save user's informa-
tion including one mask and the jury information for each user. Given 
that EA is a dedicated organization, this is not excessive either. 
• LA has to recover the private key in case of law enforcement. 
Each juror needs to generate 2 keys for communication and decrypts 
once to recover the share. Also, he/she has to save only one share per 
user. This is considered acceptable because it does not occupy a lot of 
jury's computing time and memory. 
Unlike Clipper chip, the key pair is generated by the smart card and not 
embedded during manufacturing. However, the security of this scheme still 
heavily depends on the security of the smart card itself. 
However, a software solution offers a flexibility and versatility that hard-
ware does not have. A family of compatible products is an excellent way 
to sell new technology. Vendors will often offer capability of beginning with 
low-cost software, with the option of upgrading to higher-performance and 
more expensive hardware when needed. 
A software solution that prevents the user from cheating without resorting 
to a smart card is as follows. 
6.4 Scheme 2 
6.4.1 Key Registration 
This is based on the subset method for RSA in [28] (p. 127^128). In the subset 
method, the set of trustees is divided into different subsets such that each 
subset has a unique composition. The same secret is then shared repeatedly 
among trustees in the subset. To recover the secret, it is sufficient to have 
all shares of only any one subset. Similarly, M jurors are first randomly 
selected by the EA to form a jury. The user's private key is then repeatedly 
shared among different subsets of the same jury. To recover the private key. 
LA needs to have all shares of any one subset from the jury. Consider the 
following parameters for secret sharing: n = M, T = t + 1. 
1. User requests key escrow service from EA. 
2. Go through the jury challenge protocol in step 2 to 10 of section 6.3.1 
in scheme 1. 
3. User does the following: 
• Chooses two primes p and q congruent to 3 mod 4 as his/her 
private key, and computes n = p * q. 
• Generates all T-subsets of the jury consisting of M selected jurors, 
where a subset is represented by a T-tuple J^ = (Ji,.... Jj) and 
J i , . . . , JT represent different jurors from the chosen jury. There 
are C^^ such subsets. For each tuple J^, the user repeats the 
following steps. 
Chooses randomly T Jacobi symbol +1 integers Xi,^, . . . ,XT,S in 
Z*, where Z* is the multiplicative group of the integers between 
1 and n which are relatively prime to n. 
Computes the following: 
- Xs = Xi^s * ... * Xt,s TTiod n. 
- = * Xk,s rnod n foT k = 1,... 
- Zs = X^^^ * ... * X^^^ mod n. 
Note that Zs itself is a square. One square root of Zs mod n 
is Xs which has Jacobi symbol +1. 
- Computes Ys, which is one of the Jacobi symbol - 1 roots 
mod n of . . •, ^ will be the public pieces and 
Xi^s, • •. will be the corresponding private pieces. 
• To each juror A; in J^, sends the private piece Xk,s and n through 
EA as in scheme 1. 
• Sends EA the value of Ys and n. 
4. Juror k in J^ does the following: 
• Checks that Xk,s has Jacobi symbol +1. 
• Computes X^^^ = Xk,s * T^od n. 
• Sends Xl^ to EA. 
• Stores Xk,s-
5. EA does the following: 
• Checks whether Y^ mod n = X^^^ * ... * mod n. In this way, 
it is possible to verify whether the user has cheated. 
• Checks whether n is in fact a product of 2 prime numbers. 
• Stores the user and jury information, Ys and n. 
• Accepts the registration (e.g., by notifying CA and jury). 
6. CA publishes the user's pk. 
6.4.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 
1. LEA presents the case to LA. 
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject. 
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jury through EA. 
4. EA returns Ys and n to LA. 
5. Each juror returns his/her all Xî s to LA. 
6. If LA receives all T values of Xi^s in at least one tuple J^, LA then 
computes the product of the received pieces to obtain Xs- Knowing 
Xs, Ys and n, it is easy to factorise n ([36]) and to recover the private 
key. 
6.4.3 Efficiency Consideration 
In this scheme, the user has to generate one key pair but he/she has to split 
repeatedly this single private key into T shares for all possible combinations 
of subsets in the same chosen jury (total C^ ways). He/she has to generate T 
Jacobi symbol +1 integers and to compute Zs and its square root Ys of Jacobi 
symbol -1 for each subset. Computation by EA involves simple verification 
and factorization procedures. For the jurors, computation is trivial but the 
memory requirement is higher. Instead of escrowing one share per user, each 
juror has to escrow shares per user because each juror belongs to 
subsets of the same jury in the secret sharing scheme. Since M and T are 
typically small values (say 7 and 4) and each juror escrows only a few users 
(say 10), it is believed that this is still acceptable. 
6.5 Scheme 3 
In this scheme, a user can be prevented from cheating by using the "cut and 
choose" protocol ( [35]). Here the user arbitrarily generates many private 
and public key pairs (e.g., 100 pairs) and sends shares of each of them to the 
juries according some secret sharing schemes (see [40]). EA then opens all 
except one and verifies that they are all correct. The remaining unopened 
private key is taken to be correct and will be actually used by the user and 
to be escrowed by the jurors. If the number of key pairs is large and the 
penalty for cheating is high, it is in the user's interest not to cheat. 
6.5.1 Key Registration 
Let N be the number of key pairs generated by the user in the "cut and 
choose" protocol. 
1. User requests key escrow service from EA. 
2. Go through the jury challenge protocol in step 2 to 10 of section 6.3.1 
in scheme 1. 
3. EA generates N masks rrij, ioi j = I,... ,N. Each mask is a random 
number which is used to hide the private key of a user. 
4. EA sends the N masks to the user. 
5. User does the following : 
• Creates N pairs of RSA public and private keys {pkj.skj), for 
3 = 1,...,N. 
• XORs each skj with the mask mj. Let the result be skruj. Thus, 
skrrij = skj ® rrij. 
• Splits each skrrij into M shares, sij,..., SMJ- The share si^j is 
intended for juror i. 
• Collects the shares of all skrrij intended for juror i, encrypts 
it with public key Kî i (let's call the result 5i).That is, Si = 
• Sends . . . , 5m and p/ci,...,pkjsf to EA. 
6. EA does the following : 
• Generates a random number r between 1 and N. 
• Sends Si,..., SM and r to juries 1 , . . . , M. 
7. Each juror i does the following : 
• Decrypts Si with A'2,,- to recover the N shares. That is, 
. . = [Si]' 
• Sends back the N - 1 shares, except to EA. 
8. EA does the following : 
• Recovers the Â  — 1 skm^s. Each skrrij can be recovered from 
shares SI^,... .SMJ-
• XORs each with its mask. That is, skj = skrrij © rrij . In this 
way, skj except skr can be recovered. 
• Verifies that all recovered N—1 pairs of {pki.ski),..., {pk^, skjv), 
excluding {pkr,skr), are all correct. 
• Stores the user information, the jury Hst and the remaining mask 
rrir securely. 
• Accepts the registration (e.g., by notifying CA and the jurors). 
The corresponding public key will be pkr. 
9. CA publishes the user's pkr. 
10. Jurors 1 , . . . , M, securely store the remaining shares • • •, «SM,r- These 
shares are used to recover skr, if necessary. 
6.5.2 Key Recovery for Law Enforcement 
1. LEA presents the case to the legal authorities. 
2. LA assesses any prima facie evidence to proceed or reject the claim. 
3. Should the case be accepted, LA will notify the jurors through EA. EA 
will also send the mask rur to LA. 
4. Each juror i returns his/her share Sî r to LA. 
5. If the total number of shares exceeds the threshold, LA can recover the 
XORed private key skrrir. 
6. LA XORs the mask m^ to recover the private key skr. 
6.5.3 Efficiency Consideration 
This scheme is very simple but computationally most inefficient. Below is a 
breakdown of the computation for each party : 
• Each user needs to prepare N key pairs, XORs each private key with the 
mask and splits the result to M shares. He/she also has to encrypt M 
times using jurors' keys. He/she then only has to wait for EA's notice 
for which one key pair to use. Depending on the speed of his/her CPU 
and values of M and iV, this is not excessive because a user needs to 
register his/her private key occasionally and non-interactively. Hence, 
efficiency is not a critical issue. 
EA needs to generate N masks, encrypt M times using jurors' keys, 
recover Â  — 1 keys and verify that they are correct key pairs. Also, EA 
needs to save user's information including one mask and the jury list 
for each user. Given that EA is a dedicated organization, this is not 
excessive either. 
• LEA has to recover the private key in case of law enforcement. 
• Each juror needs only to generate two keys for communication and 
decrypt once to recover the shares. Also, he/she has to save only one 
share per user. This is considered acceptable because it does not occupy 
a lot of jury's computing time and memory. 
Chapter 7 
Security Analysis 
This chapter evaluates the strengths and possible attacks of the three pro-
posed democratic key escrow schemes. Some counter-measures are proposed 
to prevent or minimize these attacks. 
7.1 Strengths 
The three proposed schemes provide better protection of privacy from abuse 
of power and collusion of different parties. This section gives a brief summary 
of the strengths in these schemes and they are as follows: 
1. These schemes can be easily understood by all parties because they are 
very similar to the well established jury system. 
2. Shares are stored independently by each juror. This is democratic 
because the escrowed key is conceptually in the hands of user's peers 
(though randomly and in a scrambled way). Key recovery is possible 
only at the moment of suspected crime. This is fairer to the users and 
matches our perception of democracy. 
3. Jurors can stay offline until EA requests key registration service. Jurors 
can also stay offline after storing the shares until notified by LA to 
• return their shares. 
4. Government cannot embark upon a mass wire-tapping because the keys 
are completely decentralized. Should the government become malicious 
(e.g., due to sudden change of government), all jurors just delete their 
shares!! 
5. Even if EA's database is compromised, the private keys cannot be re-
covered because the shares are not stored in EA's database. 
6. Using jurors' keys to forward shares from user to jury through EA, 
jurors cannot learn who the user is and the user cannot learn who the 
jurors are because they only deal with EA. Thus, it is very difficult for 
the user to prevent (by bribe, threat, etc) the jurors from returning 
their shares. 
7. Even if all jurors in a jury collude together, the private key cannot be 
recovered without the mask kept by EA in schemes 1 & 3. In scheme 2, 
one private key may be compromised but the bulk of private keys are 
still secure. Also, if the jurors do not know among themselves before 
key recovery, it is infeasible for them to collude. 
8. In scheme 3, using "cut and choose" protocol, the user can cheat only 1 
in N cases. By making N sufficiently large and the penalty for cheating 
sufficiently high, the chance of cheating is minimal. 
9. The threshold can be adjusted according to the society's need and/or 
applications. For example, the Parliament can renew and adjust the 
threshold level annually after review in order to balance the protection 
of privacy and the need for law enforcement. If the government becomes 
too aggressive or it is too difficult for LEA to recover the private key, 
the threshold can be adjusted accordingly. 
10. The private key is chosen by the user. This prevents authorities from 
using weak keys to facilitate wire-tapping. 
11. Separation of duty between EA and LA provides the required check and 
balance of power. LA is responsible for the juror population but the 
jury for each user is chosen by EA. Neither LA nor EA can manipulate 
the jury. 
12. These schemes provide better opportunity to obtain international agree-
ments because the electronic jury system is an independent and impar-
tial system similar to the judicial trial systems both in common law 
and continental law. 
7,2 Possible Attacks 
This section explores some possible attacks to these schemes and explains 
how they can be avoided or minimized. These attacks are: 
1. In scheme 2, assume LA is corrupt. Instead of admitting jurors fairly, 
LA systematically admits jurors who collude with LA. Some safeguard 
can be provided by disqualifying certain classes of people (e.g., civil 
servants, etc) but still cannot prevent a malicious LA from doing this. 
This problem can be better dealt with by estabHshing a special com-
mittee to guarantee that fair selection procedures are observed. 
2. EA selects (not randomly) specific subsets of the jurors from the juror 
population provided by LA. A malicious government can then force 
them to hand over their shares, the private key can then be recovered. 
However, this scenario is extremely unlikely. Also, the same commit-
tee can check that EA indeed randomly selects the jury by periodic 
inspection. 
3. Consider the case that the government is only interested to recover a 
small set of private keys from the whole set of users. EA can provide 
the required juries to the government and the government can then 
force the juries to give up their shares to the government to enable 
wire-tapping. Even if this were true, the bulk of private keys remain 
secure. Again this is highly unlikely. This situation can be largely 
avoided by requiring EA to be an independent third party. 
4. As mentioned in 6.2.2, EA can cheat by secretly creating a pair of keys 
itself. EA then gives one of them to the user and pretends that the key 
comes from juror i. User will then encrypt juror z's share using this 
key. This enables EA to recover user's secret key easily after obtaining 
enough shares. This can be prevented by allowing the user to challenge 
the jury. A challenged jury will be exposed to the user and the user 
can then check with the jury whether EA has cheated by verifying the 
encryption key. The challenged jury will then be replaced by a new one 
by repeating the key registration scheme again. This challenge protocol 
can be repeated until the user is satisfied that EA has not cheated 
(different users may have different needs). The probability that EA can 
cheat after N rounds is (1/2)^"^ and can be theoretically made as small 
as possible but practical consideration limits the number of rounds to 
a small value (In fact, it is also feasible perform the challenge protocol 
in parellel rather than in series). Of course, as EA is assumed to be 
an independent third party, EA can be heavily penalized if it is caught 
in cheating (by law or by market force). Also, if EA is dishonest, it 
can be easily discovered because it has to register many users and any 
one of them can reveal EA's dishonesty. The opened jurors can also 
be used to indicate whether ExA has fairly selected jurors because this 
information can be made public (unless EA can collude with a large 
number of jurors). 
5. In scheme 3, each juror cannot verify his/her share is correct and not 
just random bits, so there is always a chance one in N that the user 
can cheat. 
6. It might be possible that the number of shares returned is not enough 
to recover the private key even there is a genuine need by LEA. This is 
also true in our jury system where a criminal is walked free. Of course, 
it is possible to require the jurors for the mandatory return of their 
shares if their sole responsibility is to escrow user's shares. 
7.3 Subliminal Channel 
The notion of subliminal channel was first introduced by Simmons in his 
Prisoners' problem [39]. Basically, a subliminal channel (or covert channel) 
is a covert communication channel that cannot be read by those for whom it 
is not intended. 
It was pointed out [27] that an attacker can set up a covert channel (or 
shadow public key cryptosystem) by choosing his/her key pair in the following 
manner. 
Instead of generating a key pair (P, S) as normal, the dishonest user 
generates two key pairs (P, 5) and (P ' ,5 ' ) , where (P, 5) is a proper public 
and private key pair. {P',S') is a shadow key pair and P' = f(P) where 
/ is an easily computed and publicly known function. The attacker uses 
(P, S) in the same way as would an ordinary user, but keeps S' reserved as 
his/her shadow secret key. In order for someone to send a secret message 
through this covert channel without the fear of being wiretapped, the sender 
computes P' = f{P) and then encrypts the message using P'. The receiver 
of the message then decrypts it using S'. In an attack for RSA cryptosystem 
21], the attacker does the following: 
• Generates primes p > p' and q> q'. 
• Computes n = p^ q and n' = p' ^ q'. 
• Sets Ke = n' 
• Finds Kd such that K^ ^ Kd = I mod {p - - 1). 
• Sets K'^ = {n mod n') — {n mod Ke). 
• Finds K'd such that K'^ ^ K'd = I mod {p' - l){q' - 1). 
• Hands over p, q, n, Ke, Kd to EA but keeps p', q' secret. 
The accomplices of the attacker encrypt a message m using K'̂ ^n' derived 
from Ke,n which can be obtained from a CA legitimately The attacker can 
decrypt it by K'd. In this way, the attacker can escrow his/her private key 
and yet the authorities cannot decrypt the actual messages sent by his/her 
accomplices. 
Five properties are stipulated to provide a failsafe key escrow system: 
• Each user can be sure that the secret key is chosen securely, even if all 
the trustees and central authorities are malicious. 
• The central authority will be guaranteed that the secret key for each 
user is chosen securely even if the user does not have access to a good 
random generator. 
• Each user will be guaranteed that his/her secret key will remain secret 
unless a sufficient number of trustees release their shares of the key to 
the central authority. 
• The central authority is guaranteed to be able to recover the escrowed 
key if necessary. 
• The subliminal channel is avoided. 
It is noted that one way to meet the above criteria is to require the 
key generation to be through the collaboration of the user and the EA. For 
simplicity, this thesis does not include this scenario in the above schemes. 
However, it is not difficult to extend the schemes to prevent this type of 
attack. For example, instead of letting a user to randomly choose his/her 
public key, EA can select a prime number as the user's public key. The user 
then generates two primes p, q as before and calculates the corresponding 
private key secretly. As the public key is a prime number, it is relatively 
prime to {p — l){q — 1) so that a unique private key exists. In this way, it is 
impossible for the attacker to set Kg = n' = p' ^ q' because Ke is now prime. 
Also, by selecting the public key for the user, EA has no way of learning 
the user's private key as long as it does not know p and q. In this way, the 
problem of subliminal channel can be avoided. 
Chapter 8 
Practical Consideration 
This chapter explores some practical issues which need to be considered. 
8,1 Key Recovery 
Key recovery is often more urgent. By properly selecting the jury and setting 
the threshold value for secret sharing of the private key, the process of key 
recovery can be made faster for law enforcement purposes. For example, it 
might be acceptable to have 7 jurors to form a jury and requires agreement 
of any 4 to recover an escrowed key. Also, jurors' shares can be stored in 
some portable device such as a mobile phone or an electronic wallet in order 
to facilitate urgent recovery. 
8.2 Selection Criteria of Jurors 
Ideally, every responsible user can be a juror. However, it is recommended 
to have a stricter criteria first and then gradually relax the requirement to 
allow more users to become jurors. The following are just a few guidelines : 
• Jurors should be professionals with high personal integrity (e.g., lec-
turers, doctors, accountants, etc). 
• Jurors must have good character (e.g., no previous criminal records). 
• Jurors must not be civil servants (e.g., policeman). 
8.3 Key Renewal 
It should be possible for a user to periodically renew his/her escrowed key. 
A user who feels threatened can change his/her private key more frequently 
while others can stick to the same private key for a long time. 
8.4 Share Transfer 
For some reasons, it is necessary to transfer jury's shares (e.g. if he/she is 
retired). This can be easily performed without key re-registration by the user 
through the following steps: 
• EA selects a new juror. 
• The new juror generates 2 keys using public key cryptography and 
distributes them in the same way as in step 14 of section 6.3.1 in scheme 
1. 
• The old juror .sends his/her shares to the new juror through EA as 
before. 
• The new juror recovers the shares. 
8.5 Implementation 
One possibility is to modify existing PGP software to incorporate a new 
escrow key ring for each juror. This requires the establishment of a key escrow 
agent(s). Thus, if a user wants to register his/her public key in the public key 
server, he/she has to escrow his/her private key with the key escrow agent 
beforehand. This thesis has implemented scheme 3 as a prototype and the 
source code in Java language is available in Appendix. 
8.6 Wider Applications 
The proposed schemes can shed light into the possibility of having a net 
criminal trial. Suppose the future net police arrests a net suspect who has 
allegedly committed a net crime with net evidence only (not impossible in 
the near future). The net suspect is notified and he/she can elect either to 
have a traditional jury trial or a net jury trial. If he/she elects the latter, 
the net court will conduct a net trial. The net judge will call for both net 
prosecutor and net defence lawyer to submit net evidence. A panel of net 
jurors is summoned to give a net verdict. This idea may sound like a science 
fiction now but only time will tell. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Advances in cryptography has created an opportunity to effectively use the 
power of the new emerging Information Superhighway. However, govern-
ments are hastily rushing through legislation to implement undemocratic 
key escrow schemes in order to regulate these fast growing electronic media. 
However, as pointed out in this thesis, these systems are insecure, unfair and 
undemocratic. Perhaps, eventually, one cannot escape from having some kind 
of key escrow system because not all individuals cannot be fully trusted. On 
the other hand, individuals cannot unconditionally trust authorities either. 
This thesis believes that the proposed democratic key escrow schemes can 
offer a democratic, practical and socially acceptable solution to this problem. 
It is hoped that these schemes can be a starting point for further research in 
this direction. 
Appendix A 
Source Code for 
Implementation of Scheme 3 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix includes details of a prototype implementation for Scheme 3 as oudined in page 43. The prototype serves as a proof of the concept and requires further enhancement to become a realistic application. For simplicity, the following assumptions are made: 
1. Only one user is considered; 2. All jurors are online; 3. Small key values are used(both p and q are smaller than MAX which is set to 1000); 
4. The number of jurors in one jury is set to 5 only; 5. Any 3 of jurors in one jury can recover user's private key; 6. In the cut-and-choose protocol, only 10 key pairs are generated; 7. All jurors return their shares to LEA without deliberation; 8. Key recovery is set at shares 1,3 and 5 in the program; 9. No consideration is given to multi-threading of server and synchronization of methods when accessing common data; 10. No detection of deadlock situation is considered; 11. No optimization of data structures is provided; 12. No optimization of message size is considered when a message is sent across the network; 13. Some servers' hosts and ports are set in die program; 14. No error recovery procedures are included; 15. Jury registration is not included; 16. Assume all communication channels are secure. 
The prototype consists of EA, LA and 10 juror servers and user and LEA clients that are implemented in Java language of version 1.0. All the servers must run simultaneously but the user client is needed only m key registration phase and LEA client is needed only in key recovery phase. 
In order to represent all entities effectively, an Entity class is defined. This class can be used to create objects for EA, LA and LEA. For user and juror, classes User and Juror are defined separately as subclasses of Entity class because they both share some commonalities of Entity class yet they have some other unique features. 
In addition, some utility classes are also defined. RSA class is responsible for key and share operations such as generation of RSA key pairs or recovery of private key from the given shares. Classes U_InfoDialog, LEA_InfoDialog, Info and interface ResultProcessor are used to provide a user-friendly input dialog box. 
Based the above classes, it is possible to define the following classes: 
1. U This class represents the user client program which is used for key registration; 2. EA This class represents the EA server program which interacts with user and LEA 
clients; 
3. LA 
This class represents the LA server program which interacts with EA and J 
servers; 
4. J 
This class represents the juror server program which interacts with EA server 
and user and LEA clients. 
Interactions among various clients and servers follow closely the protocol of Scheme 3. 
Instructions for compiling and running of these programs can be found in the README 
section below. Output of some example sessions can be found at the end of this appendix. 
CLASS DESCRIPTION 
This section provides the specification of all classes. 
Let 
w = number of jurors in one jury t = number of jurors needed to recover a user's private key cac = number of key pairs a user has to generate in the cut-and-choose protocol 
L Entity classes 
class Entity 
Data: public String name, host (entity name and host name) public int port (port number of the host) public Socket socket (socket connection) public PrintStream ps (print stream for the socket connection) public DatalnputStream dis (input stream for the socket) 
Note: LA, EA and LEA are objects of class Entity 
class User inherits Entity 
Data: 
public int ID (user ID) public String address (user's address) public int tel (user's telephone number) public int chosen__nr (chosen key by EA NOT to be opened) public long[] pks, sks, nmod (RSA key arrays of size w) public longO rmod (prime number array of size w for Shamir's scheme) public RSAQ RSAKeys (array of size w of RSA key objects) public JurorQ jury (array of size w of selected jury) 
class Juror inherits Entity 
Data: 
public long pk, sk, p, q, nmod (juror's RSA key pair) public int UserlD (user ID) public int chosen_nr (chosen key by EA NOT to be opened) public longD shares (array of size cac for holding shares) 
2. Utility classes 
class RSA 
Methods: 
public long RandGong n) 
generates random numbers less than n 
private long Rand() 
generates random numbers less than MAX (a predefined value) 
private long LRandQ 
generates random numbers between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX 
public long Fastexp(long a, long z, long n) 
calculates fast exponentiation 
private long gcd(long a, long n) 
calculates common greatest divisor 
private boolean Tes3Prime(long n) 
tests whether n is prime 
private long PrimeQ 
generates a prime number less than MAX 
private long LPrime() 
generates a prime number between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX 
private long Inverse(long n2, long nl) 
finds the inverse of a number 
private long Public_Key() 
generates a public key 
private long Private_Key() 
generates a private key 
public void Gen_UKey() 
generates an RSA key pair for user 
public void Gen_JKeyO 
generates an RSA key pair for juror 
public long Encrypt(long X) 
encrypts X 
public long Decrypt(long Y) 
decrypts Y 
public void Split_key() 
splits a private key into w shares using Shamir's scheme 
public void Encrypt_Share(JurorD jury) 
encrypts each share with the corresponding juror's public key 
public void Decrypt_Share(longD sks, long[] mods) 
decrypts each share with the corresponding juror's private key 
public long Recover_key(int[] pos, long[] shadow, long modulus) 
recovers the private key from any t shares 
Data: 
the following methods allow changing of private data 
public void SetPK(long pk) 
public void SetSK^ong sk) 
public void SetN(long modulus) 
the following methods allow access of private data 
public long PK() 
public long SKO 
public long N() 
public long PO 
public long QO 
public long MO 
public long R() 
public longD SHARESO 
public long SHARE(int pos) 
long p, q, m, e, d, n (for RSA key pair) 
long r, a[], share[] (for Shamir scheme) 
static final int PRIME_WITNESS (maximum value for Lehman's test) 
static final int MAX = 1000 (arbitray set constant) 
static final int t = 3, w = 5 (theshold values) 
class U_InfoDialog inherits Dialog 
private TextField fieldl, field2, field3 
these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box by user 
class LEA_InfoDialog inherits Dialog 
private TextField fieldl, field2, fieldS 
these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box by LEA 
class Info 
public String fieldl, field2, fieldS 
these fields are used to store the input data from the dialog box 
interface ResultProcessor 
public void processResult(Dialog source. Object obj) 
this method allows the implementor program to obtain data from dialog box source 
3. User client program 
class U inherits Frame and implements ResultProcessor 
Buttons: 
User Registration Information 
Display an input dialog box and capture user information 
EA Connection Information 
Display an input dialog box and capture EA information 
Request Jury Request EA to send jury's encryption keys to user 
Challenge Jury 
Requested jury is challenged 
EA has to send juror's connection information to user 
User then connects to each juror of the challenged jury 
Each juror sends p and q to user 
User checks if p*q = n for each juror 
If this is true for aU w jurors, then the EA is honest 
Accept Chosen Jury 
User accepts the selected jury 
User proceeds to generate key pairs 
Generate Keys 
Generates all cac RSA key pairs for cut-and-choose protocol 
Write all keys to a file caUed "Ukey.dat" 
Generate Shares 
Reads cac key pairs from "Ukey.dat" file 
Generates w shares for each of all cac private keys 
Send Shares to Jury 
Sends all shares to jury via EA 
Waits for the reply from EA 
If EA accepts registratioin, EA sends which key pair is chosen 
Write selected key pair to the same file 





gives the instruction for the next step to follow 






FileOutputStream fos (write to file "Ukey.dat") 
PrintStream f 
FilelnputStream fis (read from file "Ukey.dat") 
DatalnputStream if 
String fname (file name) 
int w, cac 
4. EA server program 
classEA 
Methods: 
public void EA_listenO 
Starts the EA server 
Reads the first message from the client 
Classify each client 
Handles each client according to its type 
public void handle_LEA(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
Handles LEA request for recovery suspect's private key 
by sending all w jurors connection information to LEA 
public void handle__U(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
Handles user's registration by recording user information and 
then sends back user's ID 
public void Summon_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
EA requests jury from LA 
LA sends w randomly selected jurors 
LA sends connection infommation of this jury to EA 
EA dien summons the jury 
Each juror sends die encryption key to EA 
EA pass all w encryption keys to user 
public void Challenge_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
User challenges the selected jury 
EA sends connection information of the challenged jurors to user 
public void Accept_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
User sends all cac public keys to EA 
User sends w encrypted shares of corresponding private key to EA 
EA sends the shares to corresponding jurors 
EA generates a random number less than cac 
EA sends cac to each juror 
Each juror returns w-1 decrypted unchosen shares to EA 
EA recovers the w-1 private keys 
EA checks whether these keys are genuine 
EA notifies user the result 
Data: 




UserQ (array of all users) 
User (current user) 
ServerSocket listener (server socket) 
5.LA server program 
classLA 
Methods: 
public int Rand(int n) 
Generates a random number less than n 
public void readFileO 
Reads in the juror population kept in the file "Jlistdat" 
public void LA_listenO 
Starts the LA server 
Reads the first message from the client 
Classify each client 
Handles each client according to its type 
public void handle_J(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
Accepts new juror registration 
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
Randomly selects w jurors from the juror population 
Sends connection information of these w jurors to EA 
Data: 
int next (next user DD) 
Entity[] jurors (array of jurors) 
ServerSocket listener (server socket) 
FilelnputStream fis (input stream to read juror file) 
DatalnputStream rf 
String fname (" Jlistdat") 




public void J_listen() 
starts the J server 
reads the first message from the client 
classify each client 
handles each client according to its type 
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
generates a key pair 
sends the encryption key to EA 
if user does not challenge this juror, receives all cac shares from EA 
decrypt all shares and returns aU unchosen shares to EA 
public void handle__U(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
user challenges this juror 
juror sends the values of p and q to user 
public void handle__LEA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
LEA requests share for recovery of user's private key 





ServerSocket listener (server socket) 
7. LEA client program 
class LEA extends Frame implements ResultProcessor 
Buttons: 
User Information 
display an input dialog box and capture user information 
EA Connection Information 
display an input dialog box and capture EA information 
Request Jury's Shares 
requests jury's connection information from EA 
sends request to each of w jurors 
recvoers the suspect's private key 




Gives the instruction for the next step to follow 
notifies the result of each step 
Data: 
TextField status 
Entity E A 
User user 
int w 
long r, sk 
long[] shares 
README 
This section explain how to install, compile and run these programs. 
Follow the steps below: 
1. Create a new directory; 
2. Copy all programs into this directory; 
3. Change the host name and port number of the servers if necesseary; 
4. Compile all modules using the following command: 
javac -deprecation *.java 
5. Run the clients and servers in the following order: 
5.1 LA by typing Java LA 
5.2 EA by typing Java EA 
5.3 J by typing Java <port number> (port number from 1 to 10) 
5.4 U by typing Java LF 
5.5 LEA by typing Java LEA 
6. Instructions for user client: 
6.1 push button "User Registration Information" and enter user information; 
6.2 push button "EA Connection Information" and enter EA information; 
6.3 push button "Request Jury", user can either accept or challenge the jury; 
6.4 push button "Challenge Jury" to challenge selected jury; 
6.5 repeat the steps 6.3 and 6.4 until user is satisfied that EA is honest; 
6.6 push button "Accept Chosen Jury" to accept selected jury; 
6.7 push button "Generate Keys" to generate cac key pairs which are 
written to a data file called Ukey.dat; 
6.8 push button "Generate Shares" to generate w shares for each private 
key; 
6.9 push button "Send Shares to Jury" to send shares to jury via EA; 
6.10 if user does not cheat, the chosen key wiU be rewritten to the same 
data file; 
6.11 user can try to cheat by changing some private keys in the data file 
before share generation. User may be caught cheating by EA and a 
warning message will be displayed. 
7. Instructions for LEA client: 
7.1 push button "User Information" and enter user information; 
7.2 push button "EA Connection Information" and enter EA information; 
7.3 push button "Request Jury's Shares" to request suspect's shares from 
the jury; 
7.4 push button "Recover User's Key" to recover the suspect's private key 
which will be displayed in the screen. 
SOURCE CODE 
1. Entity .Java 
import java.neL*; 
import java.io.*; 
class Entity { 
public String name, host; 
public int port; 
public Socket sock; 
public PrintStream ps; 
public DatalnputStream dis; } 
2. User .Java 
class User extends Entity 
public String address; 
public int tel; 
public int ID, chosen_nr; 
public long[] pks, sks, nmod, rmod; 
public RSA[] RSAKeys; 
public Juror[] jury; } 
3. Juror.java 
class Juror extends Entity { 
public long pk, sk, p, q, nmod; 
public int chosen_nr, UserlD; 
public longO shares; } 
4. Info.java 
class Info { 
/* 
this class contains fields the are used to store the input data from dialog box 
*/ 
public String fdl; 
public String fd2; 
public String fd3; 
public Info(String f l , String f2. String f3) 
{ f d l = f l ; f d 2 = f2;fd3 = f3; } } 
5. ResultProcessor.java 
import Java.awL*; 
interface ResultProcessor { 
/ * 
this interface allows the implementor program to obtain data from dialog box 
*/ 
public void processResult(Dialog source, Object obj); 
6.RSA.java 
public class RSA { 
public RSAO { 
p = q = m = e = d = n = -l; 
a = new long[t]; 
share = new long[w]; 
} 
//generate random numbers less than n and MAX 
public long Rand(long n) { 
long a = (long) ((Math.randomO*MAX) % n); 
return a; 
} 
//generate random numbers less than MAX (a predefined value) 
private long RandQ { 
long a = (long) (Math.random() * MAX); 
return a; 
} 
//generate random numbers between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX 
//this is used to generate the prime number for Shamir's scheme 
private long LRandQ 
boolean done = false; 
long a = 0; 
while(!done) { 
a = (long) (Math.random() * MAX * MAX • MAX); 
if(a>MAX*MAX) 
done = true; 
} 
return a; } 
//compute a'̂ z mod n public long Fastexp(long a, long z, long n) 
long X = 1; while (z != 0) { 
while (z % 2 = 0) { 
z/=2; 
a = ( ( a % n) * ( a % n ) ) % n; } 
Z - ; 
X = ( ( X % n ) * ( a % n ) ) % n; } return x; } 
//compute the common greatest divisor by using //Euclidean algorithm private long gcdQong a, long n) { 
if(a > n) { 
long tmp = a; a = n; n = tmp; 
} long gO = n; long gl = a; long g2 = 0; 
while(gl 1=0) { 
g2 = g0%gl ; gO = gl; gl = g2; } return gO; 
} 
//test whether n is prime by using Lehman's test private boolean TestPrime(long n) 
if(n % 2 = 0) return false; 
int i = 0; long a, result; 
} 
whHe (i < PRIME^WITNESS) 
a = Rand(n); 
if(gcd(a, n) > 1) return false; 
result = Fastexp(a, (n-l)/2, n); 
if((result == 1) II (result == n-1)) i++; 
else return false; } 
return true; 
//generate a prime number less than MAX 
private long PrimeQ { 
boolean done = false; 
long prime = 1; 
while((!done) II (prime = 1)) { 
prime = Rand(); 
done = TestPrime(prime); 
return prime; } 
//generate a prime number between MAX*MAX and MAX*MAX*MAX 
private long LPrime() { 
boolean done = false; 
long prime = 1; 
while((!done) II (prime == 1)) { 
prime = LRand(); 
done = TestPrime(prime); } 
return prime; } 
//find the inverse of n2 mod nl by using 
//extended Euclidean algorithm 
private long Inverse(long n2, long nl) { 
if(n2 < 0) n2 = nl + n2; 
long inverse; 
long tmp = nl; 
long al = 1: 
long bl = 0 
long a2 = 0 
long b2 = 1; 
long t = 0; 
long q = nl /n2; 
long r = nl - q * n2; 
while (r != 0) { 
nl = n2; 
n2 = r; 
t = a2; 
a2 = al - q*a2; 
al = t; 
t = b2; 
b2 = bl - q * b2; 
b l = t ; 
q = nl / n2; 
r = nl - q * n2; 
inverse = (b2 > 0) ? b2 : tmp + b2; 
return inverse; } 
//generate a public key 
private long I^blic_KeyO { 
long aRand = 0; 
boolean done = false; 
while(!done) { 
aRand = Rand(m); 
if (gcd(aRand, m) = 1) done = true; } 
System.out.println("public key:" + aRand); 
return aRand; } 
//generate a private key 
private long Private__Key() { 
long aPKey; 
aPKey = Inverse(e, m); 
System.outprintln("private key:" + aPKey); 
return aPKey; 
} 
//generate an RSA key pair for user 
public void Gen_UKey() { 
while(true) { 
p = PrimeO; 
if(p < 200) break; 
} 
System.out.println("p:" + p); 
while(true) 
{ 
q = PnmeO; 
if((q < 200) && (q != p)) break; 
System.out.println("q:" + q); 
n = p * q; 
System.out.println("n:" + n); 
m = (p- l )* (q- l ) ; 
System.out.println("m:" + m); 
e = Public^KeyO; 
d = Private_Key(); 
long unity = (e * d) % m; 
System.out.println("e * d mod m = " + unity); 
} 
//generate an RSA key pair for juror 




p = PrimeO; 
if(p > 200) break; 
} 
System.out.println("p:" + p); 
while(true) 
{ 
q = PrimeO; 
if((q > 200) && (q != p)) break; 
} 
System.out.println("q:" + q); 
n = p * q; 
System.out.prindn("n:" + n); 
m = (p- l )* (q- l ) ; 
System.ouLprintlnC'm:" + m); 
e = Public_Key(); 
d = Private_Key(); 
long unity = (e * d) % m; 
System.out.println("e * d mod m = " + unity); 
} 
//encrypt X 
public long Encrypt(long X) 




public long Decrypt(long Y) 
long X = Fastexp(Y, d, n); 
return X; 
} 
//split a private key into w shares using Shamir's scheme 
public void Split_key() 
r = LPrimeO; //r must be greater than n or MAX*MAX 
while((r <= d) II (r <= w)) 
r = PrimeO; 
a[0] = share[0] = d; //d is the secret 
System.out.println("r = " + r); 
//generate w different numbers 
for(int i=l; i<t; i-H-) { 
boolean done = false; 
while(!done) { 
int collision = 0; 
a[i] = Rand(r); 
for(intj = 0;j <i; j++) 
if(a[i] = a[j]) 
collision++; 
if(collision == 0) done = true; 
} 
share[0] += a[i]; } 
//generate shares 
share[0] %= r; 
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++) 
System.outprindnC'coeff" + i + " = " + a[i]); 
System.out.prindn("share " + 0 + " = " + share[0]); 
for(int i = 1; i < w; i-H-) { 
share[i] = a[0] + (i + 1) * a[l]; 
for(intj = 2; j<t ; j++) 
share[i] += ajj] * Fastexp(i + 1, j, r); 
share[i] %= r; 
System.out.prindn("share " + i + " = " + share[i]); 
} } 
//encrypt each share with the corresponding juror's public key 
public void Encrypt_Share(Juror[] jury) { 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) 
share[i] = Fastexp(share[i], jury[i].pk, jury[i].nmod); 
} 
//decrypt each share with the corresponding juror's private key 
public void Decrypt_Share(long[] sks, longQ mods) 
for(int i = 1; i < w; i++) 
sharep] = Fastexp(share[i], sks[i], mods[i]); 
} 
//recover the private key from any t shares 
public long Recover_key(int[] pos, long[] shadow, long modulus) 
long sum = 0; 
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++) { 
long numerator = 1; 
long denominator = 1; 
for(intj = 0; j<t; j++) { 
ifa!=i) { 
numerator *= -pos[j]; 
denominator *= (pos[i] - pos[j]); } } 
if(numerator < 0) numerator = modulus + numerator; 
sum += shadow[i] * numerator * Inverse(denominator, modulus); } 
sum %= modulus; 
return sum; } 
//the following methods allow changing of private data 
public void SetPK(long pk) { 
e = pk; 
} 
public void SetSK(long sk) { 
d = sk; 
} 
public void SetN(long modulus) { 
n = modulus; 
) 
//the following methods allow access of private data 
public long PK() 
return e; 
public long SK() 
return d; 
public long N() 
return n; 
public long P() 
return p; 
public long QO 
return q; 
public long MO 
return m; 
public long RO 
return r; 
public longD SHARESO //return aU shares 
return share; 
public long SHARE(int pos) //return one specified share { 
return share[pos]; 
} 
private long p, q, m, e, d, n, r, aQ, shareQ; static final int PRIME_WITNESS = 99; static final int MAX = 1000; static final int t = 3; static final int w = 5; 
7. Jlistdat 
peterl vivaldi 6001 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter3 vivaldi 
6003 peter4 vivaldi 6004 peterS vivaldi 
6005 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter? vivaldi 6007 peterS vivaldi 6008 petei9 vivaldi 6009 peterlO vivaldi 6010 
8. U.java 
import Java, awt *; import javaio.*; importjava.net*; 
this class contains fields that are used to capture input data from dialog box 
class U_InfoDialog extends Dialog { 
/* 
this constructor creates a GUI dialog box for a user to enter his personal data 
*/ pubUc U_InfoDialog(U parent, Info u, String fDl, String fD2, String fD3) { 
super(parent, "Input Info", true); 
Panel pi = new PanelQ; 
pl.setLayout(new GridLayout(3, 2)); 
pLadd(new Label(fDl)); 
pl.add(FDl = new TextField(u.fdl, 8)) 
pl.add(new Label(fD2)); 
pl.add(FD2 = new TextField(u.fd2, 8)) 
pLadd(new Label(fD3)); 
pLadd(FD3 = new TextField(u,fd3, 8)) 
add("Center", pi); 






this method handles action event and captures user input after a user 
pushes the "Ok" button 
*/ 




new Info(FDl.getText(), FD2.getText(), FD3.getText())); 
else if (arg.equals("Cancel")) 
disposeO; 
else return super.action(evt, arg); 
return true; } 
this method destroys the dialog box 
*/ 
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt) { 
if (evtid = Event WINDOW.DESTROY) 
disposeO; 




these fields are used to capture input data from the dialog box 
private TextField FDl; 
private TextField FD2; 
private TextField FD3; 
} 
/* 
User client program 
*/ 
public class U extends Frame implements ResultProcessor 
/* 
This constructor creates entity objects and a GUI frame so that a 
user can perform key escrow procedure and check the status easily 
pubHc U() { 
LA = new Entity(); 
EA = new EntityO; 
user = new User(); 
fname = "Ukey.dat"; 
w = 5; 
cac = 10; 
setTitleC'User Registration"); 
setLayout(new RowLayoutQ); 
add(new Button("User Registration Information")); 
add(new Button("EA Connection Information")); 
add(new Button("Request Jury")); 
add(new Button("Challenge Jury")); 
add(new Button("Accept Chosen Jury")); 
add(new ButtonfGenerate Keys")); 
add(new Button("Generate Shares")); 
add(new Button("Send Shares to Jury")); 
Label st = new Label ("Status Bar"); 
add(st); 




This is an implementation of the interface processResult 
which actually pass data from a dialog box to this program 
*/ 
public void processResult(Dialog source, Object result) { 
if(source instanceof U_InfoDialog) { 
Info info = (Info)result; 
if("EA".equals(info.fdl)) //it is an EA input dialog box { 
EA.host = info.fd2; 
EA.port = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3); } 
else //it is a user input dialog box 
user.name = info.fdl; 
user.address = info.fd2; 




^ s method destroys the user client window and exits the program 
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt) 
if(evtid = Event.WINDOW_DESTROY) System.exit(O); 
return super.handleEvent(evt); 
/* 
this method capmres action event and takes appropriate action 
depending the type of event 
*/ 
public boolean action(Event evt. Object arg) 
try{ 
this event handles user's input of personal data 
*/ 
if (arg.equalsC'User Registration Information")) { 
System.out.prindn("User Registration Information"); 
Info inl = new Info("name", "uow", "8888"); 
U_InfoDialog pdl = new U__InfoDialog(this, inl, "name", 
"address", "tel no"); 
pdl.showO; 
status.setText("next step: enter EA information"); 
} /• 
this event handles user's input of EA's connection information 
*/ 
else if(arg.equals("EA Connection Information")) { 
Info in2 = new Info("EA", "vivaldi", "3838"); 
UJnfoDialog pd2 = new U_InfoDialog(this, in2, "name", "host", 
"port"); 
pd2.show(); 
System.out.println(EA.name + " " + EA.host + " " + EA.port); 
status.setText("Trying to connect to EA..."); 
System.out.println("Trying to connect to EA..."); 
/* 
connect to EA's socket 
•/ 
EA.sock = new Socket(EA.host, EA.port); 
EA.dis = new DataInputStream(EA.sock.getInputStream()); 
EA.ps = new PrintStream(EA.sock.getOutputStream()); 
status.setText("Connected to EA, request jury now!!!"); 
System.out.println("Connected to EA, request jury now!!!"); 
/* 
send request for key escrow service to EA 
EA.ps.println("U REQ REG EA"); 
/* 





this event handles user's request to EA for jury 
*/ 
else if(arg.equals("Request Jury")) { 
System.out,println("Request Jury"); 
EA.ps.println("U REQ EA"); //send the request 
status.setText("Requesting jury..."); 
System.out.println(EA.dis.readLine());//display EA's reply 
/* 
read in encryption keys of w jurors from EA 
*/ 
user .jury = new Juror[w]; 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.ouLprintln("pk of juror " + i); 
Juror juror = new Juror(); 
juror, pk = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.readLine()); 
System.outprintln(String.valueOf(juror.pk)); 
juror.nmod = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.rea(lLine()); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.nmod)); 
user.jury[i] = juror; 
status.setText("Challenge or Accept jury now!!!"); 
System.out.prindn("Challenge or Accept jury now!!!"); 
} 
this event handles challenge of jury by user 
else if(arg.equals("Challenge Jury")) 
System.out.println("Challenge Jury"); 
/* 
user sends challenge to EA 
*/ 
EA.ps.println("U CHALLENGE J EA"); 
int honest = 0; 
System.out.println(EA.dis.readLine())-y/display EA's reply 
/* 
user reads connection information of w jurors from EA 
and check with each juror whether EA is honest 
*/ 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.out.println("connect to juror " + i); 
user reads connection information of each juror from EA 
*/ 
Juror juror = user.jury[i]; 
juror.name = EA.dis.readLineO; 
System.out.println(juror.name); 
juror.host = EA.dis.readLineO; 
System.out.printin(juror.host); 
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(iEA.dis.readLine()); 
System.out.printin(String.valueOf(juror.port)); 
/* 
user reads connects to each juror 
*/ 
juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port); 
juror.dis = new 
DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream()); 
juror.ps = new PrintStream (juror.sock.getOutputStreamQ); 
user sends challenge to juror 
*/ 




user reads p and q from each juror */ 
juror.p = Long.parseLongCjuror.dis.readLineO); 





user checks whether EA is honest with respect to this juror 
*/ 
if(juror.p*juror.q == juror.nmod) honest++; 
System.out.printin("honesty value is:" + 
String. valueOf (honest)); } 
/* 
notify user whether EA is honest 
*/ 
if(honest == w) status.setText("EA is honest!!!"); 
else status.setTextC'EA is NOT honest!!!"); 
if(honest == w) System.out.println("EA is honest!!!"); 
else System.out.prinan("EA is NOT honest!!!"); 
} 
/* 
this event handles user's acceptance of jury 
else if (arg.equalsC'Accept Chosen Jury")) 
status.setText("next step: Generate Keys!!!"); 
System.out.println("next step: Generate Keys!!!"); 
/ • 
this event handles generation of cac key pairs 
*/ 
else if (arg.equals("Generate Keys")) { 
System.ouLprintln("Generate Keys and write to file"); 
try{ 
fos = new FileOutputStream(fname); 
f = new Printstream(fos); 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 
user.RSAKeys = new RSA[cac]; 
for(int i=0; i< w; i-H-) 
user.jury[i].shares = new long[cac]; 
/* 
generate cac key pairs and write all keys to a file 
*/ 
for(int i=0; i< cac; i++) { 







status.setText("done!!! next step: Generate Shares now!!!"); 
} 
/* 
this event handles generation of w shares for each of cac private keys 
Note: a user can try to cheat by tampering with the private keys in the file 
before this step is performed but he/she may be caught by EA 
•/ 
else if (arg.equals("Generate Shares")) 
System.out.println(" Read file and Generate Shares"); 
try { 
fis = new FilelnputStream(fname); 
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis); 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 
read the keys back from the file and split each private key into w shares 
*/ 
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++) { 
long pk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine()); 
user.RSAKeys[i].SetPK(pk); 
long sk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine()); 
user.RSAKeys[i].SetSK(sk); 




encrypt each share with corresponding juror's encryption key 
*/ 
user.RSAKeys[i].Encrypt_Share(user.jury); 
for(int j = 0; j < w; j++) 
user.jury[j].shares[i] = user.RSAKeys[i].SHARE(j); 
} 
fis.closeO; 
status.setTextC'done!!! next step: Send Shares now!!!"); 
} 
/* 
this event handles user's sending of shares to each of w jurors via EA after 
user has accepted the jury 
else if (arg.equalsC'Send Shares to Jury")) 
System.out.println("Send encrypted shares to Jury"); 
/* 
notify EA to receive shares 
*/ 
EA.ps.prindn("U SEND SHARES EA"); 
status.setText("Sending shares!!!"); 
/* 
send cac public keys to EA first 
System.out.println("send cac public keys to EA first"); 
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++) 









send encrypted shares to jurors via EA 
*/ 
System.out.println("send encrypted shares to jurors via EA"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.out.println("shares to juror" + i); 







EA accepts key registration 
*/ 
ifC'EA ACCEPT KEY U".equals(EA.dis.readLineO)) { 
System.outprindnC'EA accepts key registration"); 
read the chosen key 
*/ 
String s = EA.dis.readLine(); 
System.ouLprintlnC'chosen key no:" + s); 
user.chosen_nr = Integer.parselnt(s); 
try { 
fis = new FilelnputStream(fname); 
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis); 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 
long pk = 0, sk = 0, n = 0; 
/* 
overwrite the file with this chosen key 
*/ 
for(int i = 0; i <= user.chosen_nr; i++) { 
pk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLine()); 
sk = Long.parseLong(rf.readLineO); 




fos = new FileOutputStream(fname); 
f = new Printstream(fos); 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 
System.out.prindn("pk:" + String.valueOf(pk)); 
System.ouLprintln("sk:" + String.valueOf(sk)); 










status.setTextC'chosen key:" + 
String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr) + " Jcey escrow done!!!"); 
System.out.println("key escrow done!!!"); 
status.setText("You are caught cheating!!!"); 
System.outprintln("You are caught cheating!!!"); 
} ^ 
else return super.action(evt, arg); 




public static void main(StringO args) { 


















class EA { 
public EA() { 
} 
next = 0; 
w = 5; 
t = 3; 
cac = 10; 
aRSA = new RSA(); 
LA = new Entity(); 
EA = new Entity(); 
users = new User[cac]; 
listener = null; 
/* 
this method starts the EA server 
*/ 
public void EA_listen() throws lOException 
listener = new ServerSocket(3838); 
while (true) { 
Socket sock = listener.accept(); 
PrintStream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream()); 
DatalnputStream cin = new 
DataInputStream(sock. getlnputStream 0); 
ifC'LEA REQ USER EA".equals(cin.readLine()))// if cHent is LEA { 
System.out.println("LEA requests suspect's key"); 
handle_LEA(sock, cin, cout); 
} 
else //if client is user { 
System.out.println("User request"); 
handle_U(sock, cin, cout); 
String s = cin.readLineO; 
System.out.println(s); 
boolean accept = false; 
while(! accept) // if user does not accept jury { 
if("U REQ EA".equals(s)) //user requests jury 
Summon_J(sock, cin, cout); 
else if("U CHALLENGE J EA".equals(s)) 
//user challenges jury 
Challenge_J(sock, cin, cout); 
else 
break; 
s = cin.readLineO; 
System.out.println(s); 
System.out.println("call Accept_J"); 
Accept_J(sock, cin, cout); //user accepts jury 
sockxloseO; 





this method handles LEA's request 
*/ 
public void handle_LEA(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws 
lOException { 
/* 
return the prime number used in secret sharing 
*/ 
System.out.println("send r :" + 
String.valueOf(user.rmod[user.chosen_nr])); 
cout.println(String. valueOf(user.rmod [user.chosen_nr])); 
System.out.println(cin.readLine()); 
cout.println("EA SEND JURY INFO LEA"); 
System.out.println("EA SEND JURY INFO LEA"); 
/* 
send suspect's jury to LEA 
*/ 
System.out.println("send suspect's jury"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 










this method handles registration of user's personal data 
*/ 
public void handle_U(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws 
lOException { 
user = new User(); 
user.sock = sock; 
user.ID = next; 
user.dis = cin; 
user.ps = cout; 
/* 
record user info 
*/ 
System.out.prindn("record user info"); 
user.name = user.dis.readLine(); 
System.out.println(user.name); 
user.host = user.dis.readLine(); 
System, out.println(user.host); 
user.port = Integer.parseInt(user.dis.readLine()); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(user.port)); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(next)); 
users[next] = user; } 
/* 
this method summons the jury 
*/ 
public void Summon_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
throws lOException { 
System.out.println("summons the jury"); 
/* 
this port is fixed and must be changed and recompiled again if this program 
is run in another host other than "vivaldi" 
*/ 
LA.sock = new Socket("vivaldi", 8383); 
LA.dis = new DataInputStream(LA.sock.getInputStream()); 
LA.ps = new PrintStream(LA.sock.getOutputStream()); 
/* 
EA requests jury from LA 
*/ 
LA.ps.println("EA REQ J LA"); 
System.out.println("EA REQ J LA"); 
users[next].ps.printin("EA SEND JKEYS U"); 
System.out.println("EA SEND JKEYS U"); 
System.out.println(LA.dis.readLine()); 
users[next].jury = new Juror[w]; 
System.out.prindn("read jury's connection information"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i+4-) { 
System.out.println("Juror " + i); 
/* 
read jury's connection information 
*/ 
Juror juror = new JurorQ; 
juror.name = LA.dis.readLineO; 
System.out.println(juror.naine); 
juror.host = LA.dis.readLine(); 
System.out.println(juror.host); 
String s = LA.dis.readLineO; 
System.out.println(s); 
juror.port = Integer.parselnt(s); 
System .out. println(j uror. name); 
System.out.println(juror.host); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port)); /* 
connect to each juror's socket 
*/ 
juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port); 
juror.dis = new DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream()); 
juror.ps = new PrintStream(juror.sock.getOutputStreamO); 
summon each juror 
*/ 
juror.ps.printlnC'EA SUMMON J"); 




each juror sends encryption key to EA 
*/ 
System.out.println(juror.dis.readLineO); 
juror.pk = Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine()); 
juror.nmod = Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine()); 
/* 






user.jury[i] = juror; } } 
/ * 
this method handles challenge of jury 
*/ 
public void Challenge_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
throws lOException { 
System.outprintlnC'challenge of jury"); 
/* 
EA sends jury's connection information to user 
*/ 
user.ps.printlnC'EA SEND JINFO U"); 
System.out.println("EA SEND JINFO U"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
Juror juror = user .jury [i]; 
juror.ps.printlnC'EA CHALLENGE J"); 








for(int i = 0; i<w; i++) { 
user .jury [i].sock.close(); } } 
/* 
this method handles acceptance of jury by user 
*/ 
public void Accept_J(Socket sock, DatalnputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
throws lOException { 
System.out.println("U SEND SHARES EA"); 
user.pks = new long[cac]; 
user.nmod = new long[cac]; 
user.rmod = new long[cac]; 
/* 
read cac public keys and prime numbers for secret sharing scheme of private keys 
System.out.println("read cac pk, n and r"); 
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++) 
System.out.println("user key: " + i); 
user.pks[i] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine()); 
user.nmod[i] = Long.parseLong(user.dis.readLine()); 






read all shares of user's private keys from user 
*/ System.out.println("read all shares from user and send all shares to 
jurors"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.out.println("juror: " + i); 
Juror juror = user.jury[i]; 
juror.shares = new longfcac]; 
juror.ps.printlnC'EA SEND SHARES J"); 
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.ID)); 
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++) { 
System.out.println("encrypted share: " + j); 





EA chooses a random number between 1 and cac and notify jury 
*/ 
user.chosen_nr = (int)aRSA.Rand(cac); 
System.out.println("chosen no: " + String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr)); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
Juror juror = user .jury [i]; 
juror.chosen_nr = user.chosen_nr; 
juror.ps.printlnC'EA CHOOSE KEY J"); 
juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr)); 
} 
jury send unchosen keys to EA 
*/ 
System.out.prindn("jury send unchosen keys to EA"); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.out.println("juror:" + i); 
Juror juror = user.jury[i]; 
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++) { 
System.out.println("decrypted share:" + j); 
if(j != user.chosen_nr) { 
juror.shareslj] = 
Long.parseLong(juror.dis.readLine()); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[j])); } } } 
/* 
verify shares are correct 
*/ 
System.out.prindn("verify shares are correct"); 
int[] pos = {1,3,5}-// recover shares at these positions 
long[] shadow = new long[t]; 
int honest = 0; 
for(int j = 0; j < cac; j++) { 
if(j != user.chosen_nr) //open all keys except the chosen number 
for(int i = 0; i < t; i++) { 
shadow[i] = user.jury[pos[i]-l].shares[j]; } 
/* 
recover each private key 
*/ 
long sk = aRSA.Recover_key(pos, shadow ,user.rmod|j]); 
System.out.printlnC'recovered sk:" + String.valueOf(sk)); 
/* 
simple test to check whether each recovered private key is genuine 
*/ 
long ptext = aRSA.Rand(user.nmod[j]); 
long ctext = aRSA.Fastexp(ptext, user.pks[j]. 
user.nmod[j]); 
String. valueOf (honest)); } } 
/* 
notify user whether registration is accepted 
*/ 
if(honest == 9) { 
long rtext = aRSA.Fastexp(ctext, sk, user.nmod[j]); 
if(rtext = ptext) honest++; 
System.out.println("honesty value:" + 
} 
else { 
user.ps.prindnC'EA ACCEPT KEY U"); 
user.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.chosen_nr)); 
System.out.printhi("ACCEPT KEY"); 
user.ps.printlnC'EA not ACCEPT KEY U"); 
System.out.prindn("not ACCEPT KEY"); } 
LA.sock.close(); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
user.jury[i].sock.close(); 
} 
public static void main(String[] args) throws lOException { 
EA aEA = new EA(); 
aEA.EA_listen(); } 
int next, w, t, cac; 
RSA aRSA; 
Entity EA, LA; 
User[] users; 
User user; 





class LA { 
LAO { 
} 
jurors = new Entity[99]; //juror population set to 99 
listener = null; 
fis = null; 
rf = null; 
fname = "Jlist.dat"; //file containing juror population 
w = 5; 
/* 
this method generates a random number between 1 and n - 1 
*/ 
public int Rand(int n) 
^ int a = (int) ((Math.randomQ* 10000) % n); 
return a; } 
/* 
this method reads in connection information of all jurors in the whole population 
kept in a file 
*/ 
public void readFileO throws lOException 
System.out.prindn("read juror file"); 
fis = new FilelnputStream (fname); 
rf = new DatalnputStream(fis); 
String s = null; 
while((s = rf.readLineO) != null) { 
jurors[next] = new EntityO; 
jurors[next].name = s; 
jurors[next].host = rf.readLine(); 
jurors[next].port = Integer.parseInt(rf.readLine()); 






this method starts the LA server 
*/ public void LA_listen() throws lOException 
listener = new ServerSocket(8383); //port number is fixed 
while (true) { 
Socket sock = listener.accept(); 
Printstream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream()); 
DatalnputStream cin = new 
DataInputStream(sock.getInputStream()); 
String s = cin.readLineO; 
System.out.println(s); ifC'J REQ REG LA".equals(s)) //it is a juror { 
handle_J(cin, cout); 
next-H-; 
sock.closeO; } else ifC'EA REQ J LA".equals(s)) //it is EA { 
handle_EA(cin, cout); 




this method handles juror registration 
*/ public void handle_J(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException { 
coutprintlnC'LA ACK REQ J"); //acknowledge request 
Entity juror = new EntityO; 
read in new juror's connection information 
*/ 
juror.name = cin.readLine(); 
juror.host = cin.readLine(); 
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()); 
jiirors[next] = juror; 





^ s method handles request from EA to select a jury of w jurors 
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException 
System.out.println("send jury to EA"); 
coutprintkC'LA SEND J EA"); 
int[] a = new int[w]; 
randomly select w different numbers less than the size of the juror population 
*/ 
a[0] = Rand(next); 
for(int i = 1; i < w; i++) { 
boolean done = false; 
while(!done) { 
int collision = 0; 
a[i] = Rand(next); 
for(intj = 0;j <i; j++) 
if(a[i] = aGl) 
collision++; 
if(collision==0) done = true; 
} } 




send the selected jury to EA 
*/ 






public static void mainCStringQ args) 
try{ 
LA aLA = new LA(); 
aLA,readFileO; 
aLA.LA_listenO; 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 










public class J { 
J(Juror j) { 
juror =j ; 
cac = 10; 
aRSA = new RSAQ; 
LA = new Entity0; 
EA = new EntityQ; 
listener = null; 
} 
this method starts the juror server 
public void J_listen() throws lOException 
System.out.println("juror port:" + String.valueOfQuror.port)); 
listener = new ServerSocket(juror.port); 
while (true) { 
Socket sock = listener.acceptQ; 
Prints tream cout = new PrintStream(sock.getOutputStream()); 
DataInputSU"eam cin = new DataInputStream(sock.getInputStream()); 
String s = cin.readLineO; 
System.out.println(s); 
/ * 
check the type of client 
*/ 
ifC'EA SUMMON J".equals(s)) //it is EA { 
handle_EA(cin, cout); 
sock.closeO; } 
else ifC'U CHALLENGE J".equals(s)) //it is a user 
handle_U(cin, cout); 
sock.closeO; } 







this method handles summon from EA 
*/ 
public void handle_EA(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException 
juror.UserlD = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()); //get user ID 
aRSA.Gen_JKey(); 
cout.println("JUROR SEND KEY EA"); 
System.out.println("JUROR SEND KEY EA"); 
/* 





if(!("EA CHALLENGE J".equals(cin.readLine()))) //user accepts this juror 
System.out.println("user accepts this juror"); 
System.out.println("EA SEND SHARES J"); 
juror.UserlD = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()); 
juror.shares = new long[cac]; 
/* 
read in cac shares from the user via EA */ 
System.out.println("read in cac shares from the user via EA"); 
for(int i = 0; i < cac; i++) { 
System.ouLprintln("share" + i); 
juror.shares [i] = Long.parseLong(cin.readLine()); 
System.out.println("encrypted: " + 
String.valueOf(juror.shares[i])); 
juror.shares[i] = aRSA.Decrypt(juror.shares[i]); 
System.out.println("decrypted:" + 
Stxing.valueOf(juror.shares[i])); 
System.out.println(cin.readLine()); //EA CHOOSE KEY J 
/* 
read in the chosen number from EA and then send cac - 1 unchosen shares to EA 
*/ 
juror.chosen_nr = Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine()); 
System.out.println("chosen no: " + 
String.valueOf(jurorxhosen_nr)); 
for(int i = 0;i < cac; i++) { 
if(i != juror.chosen_nr) 
cout,println(String.valueOf(juror.shares[i])); 
} } } 
/* 
this method handles challenges from the user 
*/ 
public void handle_U(DataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) throws lOException 
System.out.println("user challenges this juror"); 
if(juror.UserID == Integer.parseInt(cin.readLine())) { 
send p and q to user directly 
coutprintlnC'J SEND SECRET KEY U"); 







this method handles key recovery request from LEA 
*/ 
public void handle_LEAPataInputStream cin, PrintStream cout) 
throws lOException 
System.out.prindn("key recovery request from LEA"); 
// if(juror.UserID == Integer. parseInt(cin.readLine())) { 
cout.println("J SEND SHARE LEA"); 
System.out.prindn("J SEND SHARE LEA"); 
/* 






this method reads in an integer from the command line and adds this integer to 
6000, the resulting integer is then used as the port number of this juror 
*/ 
public static void main(Stringn args) throws lOException { 
Juror aj = new JurorQ; 
aj.port = 6000 + Integer. parselnt(args[0]); 













class LEA_InfoDialog extends Dialog 
^ public LEA_InfoDialog(LEA parent. Info u. String fDl, String fD2, String fD3) 
super(parent, "Input Info", true); 
Panel pi = new Panel(); 
pLsetLayout(new GridLayout(3, 2)); 
pl.add(new Label(fDl)); 
pl.add(FDl = new TextField(u.fdl, 8)); 
pl.add(new Label(fD2)); 
pl.add(FD2 = new TextField(u.fd2, 8)); 
pl.add(new Label(fD3)); 
pl.add(FD3 = new TextField(u.fd3, 8)); 
add("Center", pi); 





resize(350, 150); } 




^ new Info(FDl.getText(), FD2.getText(),FD3.getText())); 
else if (arg.equalsC'Cancel")) 
disposeO; 
else return super, action (evt, arg); 
return true; 
} 
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt) { 
if (evtid = Event. WINDOW_DESTROY) 
disposeO; 
else return super.handleEvent(evt); 
return true; } 
private TextField FDl; 
private TextField FD2; 
private TextField FD3; 
public class LEA extends Frame implements ResultProcessor { 
public LEA() { 
EA = new EntityO; 
user = new User(); 
fname = "LEAkey.dat"; 
w = 5; 
setTitle("User Key Recovery"); 
setLayout(new RowLayoutQ); 
add(new Button("User Information")); 
add(new Button("EA Connection Information")); 
add(new Button("Request Jury's Shares")); 
add(new Button("Recover User's Key")); 
Label st = new Label ("Status Bar"); 
add(st); 
try{ 
status = new TextField("Start: enter User Information",35); 
status.setEditable(false); 
add(status); 
pubUc void processResult(Dialog source, Object result) 
Lf(source instanceof LEA_InfoDialog) 
Info info = (Info)result; 
if("EA".equals(info.fdl)) 
EA.host = info.fd2; 
EA.port = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3); 
else { 
user.name = info.fdl; 
user, address = info.fd2; 
user.tel = Integer.parseInt(info.fd3); 
public boolean handleEvent(Event evt) 
if(evtid == Event.WINDOW_DESTROY) System.exit(O); 
return super.handleEvent(evt); 
public boolean action(Event evt, Object arg) 
if (arg.equalsC'User Information")) { 
Info ini = new Info("name", "uow","8888"); 
LEA_InfoDialog pdl = new LEA_InfoDialog(this, ini,"name", 
"address","tei no"); 
pdl.showO; 
status.setText("next step: enter EA information"); } 
else if(arg.equals("EA Connection Information")) 
Info in2 = new Info("EA", "vivaldi","3838"); 
LEA_InfoDialog pd2 = new LEA_InfoDialog(this, in2,"EA", 
"vivaldi","3838"); 
pd2.show(); 
status.setText("Trying to connect to EA..."); 
EA.sock = new Socket(EA.host, EA.port); 
EA.dis = new DataInputStream(EA.sock.getInputStream()); 
EA.ps = new PrintStream(EA.sock.getOutputStreamO); 
status.setTextC'Connected to EA, request jury now!!!"); 
EA.ps.println("LEA REQ USER EA"); 
// EA .ps.println(user.name); 
// user .ID = Integer.parseInt(EA.dis.readLine()); 
r = Long.parseLong(EA.dis.readLine()); 
System.out.println(r); 
else if(arg.equals("Request Jury's Shares")) 
System.out.println("Request Jury's Shares"); 
status.setTextC'Requesting jury..."); 
user.jury = new Juror[w]; 
shares = new long[w]; 
EA.ps.prindn("LEA REQ JURY EA"); 
System.out.printhi(EA.dis.readLine()); 
for(int i = 0; i < w; i++) { 
System.out.printlnC'info of juror "+i); 
Juror juror = new JurorQ; 
user.jury[i] = juror; 
juror.name = EA.dis.readLine(); 
System.out.println(juror.name); 
juror.host = EA.dis.readLine(); 
System.out.println(juror.host); 
juror.port = Integer.parseInt(EA.dis.readLine()); 
System.out.println(String.valueOf(juror.port)); 
juror.sock = new Socket(juror.host, juror.port); 
juror, dis = new 
DataInputStream(juror.sock.getInputStream()); 
juror.ps = new PrintStream(juror.sock.getOutputStream()); 
juror.ps.prindn("LEA RECOVER J"); 
// juror.ps.println(String.valueOf(user.ID)); 
S y stem. out. printlnQ uror. dis. readLine ()); 




status.setText("Recover User's Key Now!!!"); 
} 
else if (arg.equalsC'Recover User's Key")) { 
int[] pos = {1,3,5 }'y/can be set by inputdialog box 
long[] shadow = new long[3]; 
RSA aRSA = new RSA(); 
for(int i=0; i<3; i-f+) { 
shadow [i] = shares[pos[i]-l]; 
sk = aRSA.Recover_key(pos, shadow ,r); 
Systeni.out.println("suspect's sk: " + String.valueOf(sk)); 
status.setText("Start: enter User Information"); } 
else return super.action(evt, arg); 
}catch(IOException ioe) { } 
repaintO; 
return true; } 
public static void main(String[] args) { 








long r, sk; 
long[] shares; 
OUTPUT OF AN EXAMPLE SESSION 
The following is the output of all entities when the user is honest. 
1. Output from user client 
User Registration Information null vivaldi 3838 
Trying to connect to EA... Connected to EA, request jury now!!! 
Request Jury EA SEND JKEYS U 
pk of juror 0 499 164009 pk of juror 1 475 256769 
pk of juror 2 823 538409 pk of juror 3 727 385487 
pk of juror 4 865 338243 
Challenge or Accept jury now!!! Challenge Jury EA SEND JINFO U 
connect to juror 0 peter3 vivaldi 6003 
401 409 honesty value is: 1 
connectto juror 1 peter2 vivaldi 6002 
593 433 honesty value is: 2 
connect to juror 2 peter8 vivaldi 6008 
607 887 honesty value is: 3 
connect to juror 3 peter5 vivaldi 6005 
397 971 honesty value is: 4 
connect to juror 4 peter 10 vivaldi 6010 
827 409 honesty value is: 5 
EA is honest!!! 
Request Jury EA SEND JKEYS U 
pk of juror 0 911 210871 
pk of juror 2 121 186503 
pk of juror 4 787 507427 
Challenge or Accept jury now!!! 
connect to juror 0 peter2 vivaldi 6002 
433 487 honesty value is: 1 
connect to juror 1 peter6 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
pk of juror 1 





Challenge Jury EA SEND JINFO U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
647 433 honesty value is: 2 
connect to juror 2 peter8 
443 421 honesty value is: 3 
connect to juror 3 peter 1 
467 937 honesty value is: 4 
vivaldi 6006 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
vivaldi 6008 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
vivaldi 6001 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
connect to juror 4 peter4 
557 911 honesty value is: 5 
EA is honest!!! 
Request Jury EA SEND JKEYS U 
pk of juror 0 221 235981 
pk of juror 2 71 235387 
pk of juror 4 655 71677 
Challenge or Accept jury now!!! 
connect to juror 0 peter6 vivaldi 6006 
367 643 honesty value is: 1 
connect to juror 1 peter7 vivaldi 6007 
673 599 honesty value is: 2 
connect to juror 2 peter4 vivaldi 6004 
vivaldi 6004 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
pk of juror 1 





Challenge Jury EA SEND JINFO U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
587 401 honesty value is: 3 
connect to juror 3 peterS vivaldi 6005 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
463 359 honesty value is: 4 
connect to juror 4 peter9 vivaldi 6009 J SEND SECRET KEY U 
313 229 honesty value is: 5 
EA is honest!!! 
Request Jury EASENDJKEYSU 
pk of juror 0 727 398687 pk of juror 1 503 797191 
pk of juror 2 247 151447 pk of juror 3 509 330007 
pk of juror 4 691 130381 
Challenge or Accept jury now ! ! ! next step : Generate Keys ! ! ! 
Generate Keys and write to file 
p : 1 3 9 q : 7 1 n: 9869 m: 9660 pubUckey:169 private key: 1429 e * d m o d m = 
p:43 q: 157 n: 6751 m: 6552 pubnckey:881 private key: 1889 e * d m o d m = 
p: 109 q: 157 n: 17113 m: 16848 public key: 191 private key: 13055 e * d mod m = 
p: 131 q: 173 n: 22663 m: 22360 public key: 943 private key: 21127 e * d mod m = 
p: 199 q: 97 n: 19303 m: 19008 public key: 181 private key: 6301 e * d mod m = 
p: 167 q: 157 n: 26219 m: 25896 pubUc key: 997 private key: 22909 e * d mod m = 
p: 131 q: 173 n: 22663 m: 22360 pubUc key: 61 private key: 19061 e * d mod m = 
p: 167 q: 193 n: 32231 m: 31872 pubUc key: 349 private key: 9589 e * d mod m = 
p: 139 q: 173 n: 24047 m: 23736 pubUc key: 401 private key: 16337 e * d mod m = 
p : 1 0 9 q : 7 1 n: 7739 m: 7560 public key: 179 private key: 4139 e * d m o d m = 
Read file and Generate Shares 
r = 642873293 coeff 0 = 1429 coeff 1 = 172 coeff 2 = 319 
share 0 = 1920 share 1 = 3049 share 2 = 4816 share 3 = 7221 share 4 = 10264 
r = 844907627 coeff 0 = 1889 coeff 1 = 847 coeff 2 = 73 
share 0 = 2809 share 1 = 3875 share 2 = 5087 share 3 = 6445 share 4 = 7949 
r = 664502803 coeff 0 = 13055 coeff 1 = 219 coeff 2 = 151 
share 0 = 13425 share 1 = 14097 share 2 = 15071 share 3 = 16347 share 4 = 17925 
r = 379350749 coeff 0 = 21127 coeff 1=417 coeff 2 = 300 
share 0 = 21844 share 1 = 23161 share 2 = 25078 share 3 = 27595 share 4 = 30712 
r = 428969557 coeff 0 = 6301 coeff 1 = 154 coeff 2 = 437 
share 0 = 6892 share 1 = 8357 share 2 = 10696 share 3 = 13909 share 4 = 17996 
r = 631253789 coeff 0 = 22909 coeff 1 = 521 coeff 2 = 594 
share 0 = 24024 share 1 = 26327 share 2 = 29818 share 3 = 34497 share 4 = 40364 
r = 973767029 coeff 0 = 19061 coeff 1 = 10 coeff 2 = 714 
share 0 = 19785 share 1 = 21937 share 2 = 25517 share 3 = 30525 share 4 = 36961 
r = 636357217 coeff 0 = 9589 coeff 1 = 30 coeff 2 = 956 
share 0 = 10575 share 1 = 13473 share 2 = 18283 share 3 = 25005 share 4 = 33639 
r = 808230767 coeff 0 = 16337 coeff 1 = 526 coeff 2 = 233 
share 0 = 17096 share 1 = 18321 share 2 = 20012 share 3 = 22169 share 4 = 24792 
r = 500158847 coeff 0 = 4139 coeff 1 =458 coeff 2 = 927 
share 0 = 5524 share 1 = 8763 share 2 = 13856 share 3 = 20803 share 4 = 29604 
Send encrypted shares to Jury send cac public keys to EA first 
pk, n, r for i = 0 169 9869 642873293 pk, n, r for " " 
pk, n, r for i = 2 191 17113 664502803 pk, n, r for 
pk, n , r f o r i = 4 181 19303 428969557 pk,n, r for 
pk, n, r for i = 6 61 22663 973767029 pk, n, r for 
pk, n , r f o r i = 8 401 24047 808230767 pk, n, r for i = 9 179 7739 500158847 
send encrypted shares to jurors via EA 
shares to juror 0 
392823 359371 133254 314297 21310 382979 239508 275098 20710 345187 
= 1 881 6751 844907627 
= 3 943 22663 379350749 
= 5 997 26219 631253789 
= 7 349 32231 636357217 
shares to juror 1 
252777 496631 569178 788925 360335 396526 472822 251095 222202 71865 
shares to juror 2 
6565 26846 52447 93512 139060 51523 30440 94981 132817 120791 
shares to juror 3 
231785 188635 27217 80887 31882 15455 4532 299004 253339 216669 
shares to juror 4 
67411 119540 117940 17958 37591 16252 54236 57702 101254 94160 
EA accepts key registration chosen key no: 3 
pk:943 sk: 21127 n: 22663 key escrow done!!! 
/* 
Content of Ukey.dat before cut-and-choose protocol 
*/ 
169 1429 9869 881 1889 6751 
191 13055 17113 943 21127 22663 
181 6301 19303 997 22909 26219 
61 19061 22663 349 9589 32231 
401 16337 24047 179 4139 7739 
/* 
Content of Ukey.dat after cut-and-choose protocol 
943 21127 22663 
/* 
output from EA 
*/ 
User request record user info name 
uow 8888 0 
UREQEA 
summons the jury 
EAREQJLA 
EA SEND JKEYS U 
LA SEND J EA 
read jury's connection information 
Juror 0 peter3 vivaldi 6003 peter3 vivaldi 6003 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 499 164009 
Juror 1 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 475 256769 
Juror 2 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peter8 vivaldi 6008 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 823 538409 
Juror 3 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 385487 
Juror 4 peterlO vivaldi 6010 peterlO vivaldi 6010 
EA SUMMON J 
0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 865 338243 
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury 
EA SEND JINFO U 
EA CHALLENGE J peter3 vivaldi 6003 
EA CHALLENGE J peter2 vivaldi 6002 
EA CHALLENGE J peterS vivaldi 6008 
EA CHALLENGE J peter5 vivaldi 6005 
EA CHALLENGE J peterlO vivaldi 6010 
U REQ E A summons the jury 
EAREQJLA 
EA SEND JKEYS U 
LA SEND J EA 
read jury's connection information 
Juror 0 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi 6002 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 911 210871 
Juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 167 280151 
Juror 2 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peter8 vivaldi 6008 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 121 186503 
Juror 3 peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter 1 vivaldi 6001 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 443 437579 
Juror 4 peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter4 vivaldi 6004 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 787 507427 
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury 
EA SEND JINFO U 
EA CHALLENGE J peter2 vivaldi 6002 
EA CHALLENGE J peter6 vivaldi 6006 
EA CHALLENGE J peterS vivaldi 6008 
EA CHALLENGE J peterl vivaldi 6001 
EA CHALLENGE J peter4 vivaldi 6004 
UREQEA 
summons the jury 
EAREQJLA 
EA SEND JKEYS U 
LA SEND J EA 
read jury's connection information 
Juror 0 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi 6006 
EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 221 235981 
Juror 1 peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter7 vivaldi 6007 
EA SUMMON J 0 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 907 403127 
Juror 2 peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter4 vivaldi 6004 
EA SUMMON J 0 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 71 235387 
Juror 3 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005 
EA SUMMON J 0 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 439 166217 
Juror 4 peter9 vivaldi 6009 peter9 vivaldi 6009 
EA SUMMON J 0 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 655 71677 
U CHALLENGE J EA challenge of jury 
EA SEND JINFO U 
EA CHALLENGE J peter6 vivaldi 6006 
EA CHALLENGE J peter? vivaldi 6007 EA CHALLENGE J peter4 vivaldi 6004 EA CHALLENGE J peter5 vivaldi 6005 EA CHALLENGE J petei9 vivaldi 6009 UREQEA 
summons the jury EAREQJLA EA SEND JKEYS U 
LA SEND JEA 
read jury's connection information Juror 0 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi 6005 EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 Juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 503 Juror 2 peter2 vivaldi 6002 EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 247 151447 Juror 3 peter 10 vivaldi 6010 peterlO vivaldi 6010 EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 509 330007 Juror 4 peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter7 EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA 691 
398687 peter6 vivaldi 6006 
797191 peter2 vivaldi 6002 
vivaldi 6007 
U SEND SHARES EA U SEND SHARES EA read cac pk, n and r 
130381 call AcceptJ 
user key: 0 user key: 1 user key: 2 user key: 3 user key: 4 user key: 5 user key: 6 user key: 7 user key: 8 user key: 9 
169 881 191 943 181 997 61 349 401 179 
9869 6751 17113 22663 19303 26219 
22663 32231 24047 
642873293 844907627 664502803 379350749 428969557 631253789 973767029 636357217 808230767 500158847 7739 
read all shares from user and send all shares to jurors juror: 0 392823 encrypted share: 1 133254 encrypted share: 3 21310 encrypted share: 5 239508 encrypted share: 7 20710 encrypted share: 9 
encrypted share: 0 encrypted share: 2 encrypted share: 4 encrypted share: 6 encrypted share: 8 juror: 1 
encrypted share: 0 encrypted share: 2 encrypted share: 4 encrypted share: 6 encrypted share: 8 
359371 314297 382979 275098 345187 
252777 encrypted share: 1 496631 569178 encrypted share: 3 788925 360335 encrypted share: 5 396526 472822 encrypted share: 7 251095 222202 encrypted share: 9 71865 
juror: 2 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
juror: 3 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
juror: 4 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
chosen no: 3 
jury send unchosen 
juror: 0 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 2 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 6 
decrypted share: 8 
juror: 1 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 2 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 6 
decrypted share: 8 
juror: 2 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 2 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 6 
decrypted share: 8 
juror: 3 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 2 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 6 
decrypted share: 8 
juror: 4 d 
ecrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 2 
decrypted share: 3 
6565 encrypted share: 1 26846 
52447 encrypted share: 3 93512 
139060 encrypted share: 5 51523 
30440 encrypted share: 7 94981 
132817 encrypted share: 9 120791 
231785 encrypted share: 1 188635 
27217 encrypted share: 3 80887 
31882 encrypted share: 5 15455 
4532 encrypted share: 7 299004 
253339 encrypted share: 9 216669 
67411 encrypted share: 1 119540 
117940 encrypted share: 3 17958 
37591 encrypted share: 5 16252 
54236 encrypted share: 7 57702 
101254 encrypted share: 9 94160 
keys to EA 
1920 decrypted share: 1 2809 
13425 
6892 decrypted share: 5 24024 
19785 decrypted share: 7 10575 
17096 decrypted share: 9 5524 
3049 decrypted share: 1 3875 
14097 
8357 decrypted share: 5 26327 
21937 decrypted share: 7 13473 
18321 decrypted share: 9 8763 
4816 decrypted share: 1 
15071 
5087 
10696 decrypted share: 5 29818 
25517 decrypted share: 7 18283 
20012 decrypted share: 9 13856 
7221 decrypted share: 1 
16347 
6445 
13909 decrypted share: 5 34497 
30525 decrypted share: 7 25005 
22169 decrypted share: 9 20803 
10264 decrypted share: 1 
17925 
7949 
decrypted share: 4 17996 decrypted share: 5 40364 
decrypted share: 6 36961 decrypted share: 7 33639 
decrypted share: 8 24792 decrypted share: 9 29604 
verify shares are correct 
recovered sk: 1429 honesty value: 1 recovered sk: 1889 honesty value: 2 
recovered sk: 13055 honesty value: 3 recovered sk: 6301 honesty value: 4 
recovered sk: 22909 honesty value: 5 recovered sk: 19061 honesty value: 6 
recovered sk: 9589 honesty value: 7 recovered sk: 16337 honesty value: 8 
recovered sk: 4139 honesty value: 9 
ACCEPT KEY 
LEA requests suspect's key 
send r :379350749 
LEA REQ JURY EA 
EA SEND JURY INFO LEA 
send suspect's jury 
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter2 vivaldi 6002 





output from LA 
*/ 
read juror file 
peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter2 vivaldi 
peter4 vivaldi 6004 peter5 vivaldi 
peter7 vivaldi 6007 peter8 vivaldi 
peter 10 vivaldi 6010 
EAREQJLA 
send jury to EA 
peter3 vivaldi 6003 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peterS 
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peterlO vivaldi 6010 
EAREQJLA 
send jury to EA 
peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter6 vivaldi 
peter 1 vivaldi 6001 peter4 vivaldi 
EAREQJLA 
send jury to EA 
peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter7 
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter9 
vivaldi 6009 
EAREQJLA 
send jury to EA 
peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter2 








vivaldi 6007 peter4 vivaldi 6004 
vivaldi 6002 
output from juror 1 
juror port: 6001 
EA SUMMON J 
p:467 q:937 n: 437579 m: 436176 public key: 443 private key: 97475 
e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 
443 437579 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 467 937 
output from juror 2 
juror port: 6002 
EA SUMMON J 
p:593 q:433 n: 256769 m: 255744 pubUckey:475 private key: 38227 
e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 475 256769 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 593 433 
EA SUMMON J p:433 q: 487 n: 210871 m: 209952 
public key: 911 private key: 31343 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 911 210871 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 433 487 
EA SUMMON J 
p:269 q:563 n: 151447 m: 150616 
public key: 247 private key: 131103 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 247 151447 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 6565 decrypted: 4816 
share 1 encrypted: 26846 decrypted: 5087 
share 2 encrypted: 52447 decrypted: 15071 
share 3 encrypted: 93512 decrypted: 25078 
share 4 encrypted: 139060 decrypted: 10696 
share 5 encrypted: 51523 decrypted: 29818 
share 6 encrypted: 30440 decrypted: 25517 
share 7 encrypted: 94981 decrypted: 18283 
shares encrypted: 132817 decrypted: 20012 
share 9 encrypted: 120791 decrypted: 13856 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
LEA RECOVER J 
key recovery request from LEA 
J SEND SHARE LEA 
25078 
output from juror 3 
*/ 
juror port: 6003 
EA SUMMON J 
p:401 q:409 n: 164009 m: 163200 public key: 499 private key 151099 
e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 
499 164009 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 401 409 
output from juror 4 
juror port: 6004 
EA SUMMON J 
p:557 q:911 n: 507427 m: 505960 
public key: 787 private key: 462243 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 787 507427 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 557 911 
EA SUMMON J 
p:587 q:401 n: 235387 m: 234400 
public key: 71 private key: 72631 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 71 235387 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 587 401 
output from juror 5 
juror port: 6005 
EA SUMMON J 
p:397 q:971 n: 385487 m: 384120 
public key: 727 private key: 289543 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 385487 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 397 971 
EA SUMMON J 
p: 463 q: 359 n: 166217 m:165396 
public key: 439 private key: 105115 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 439 166217 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 463 359 
EA SUMMON J 
p:947 q:421 n: 398687 m: 397320 
public key: 727 private key: 13663 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 727 398687 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 392823 decrypted: 1920 
share 1 encrypted: 359371 decrypted: 2809 
share 2 encrypted: 133254 decrypted: 13425 
share 3 encrypted: 314297 decrypted: 21844 
share 4 encrypted: 21310 decrypted: 6892 
share 5 encrypted: 382979 decrypted: 24024 
share 6 encrypted: 239508 decrypted: 19785 
share 7 encrypted: 275098 decrypted: 10575 
share 8 encrypted: 20710 decrypted: 17096 
share 9 encrypted: 345187 decrypted: 5524 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
LEA RECOVER J 
key recovery request from LEA 
J SEND SHARE LEA 
21844 
/* 
output from juror 6 
juror port: 6006 
EA SUMMON J 
p:647 q:433 n: 280151 m: 279072 
public key: 167 private key: 148727 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 167 280151 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 647 433 
EA SUMMON J 
p:367 q:643 n: 235981 m: 234972 
public key: 221 private key: 9569 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 221 235981 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 
367 643 
EA SUMMON J 
p:821 q:971 n: 797191 m: 795400 
public key: 503 private key: 273567 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 503 797191 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 252777 decrypted: 3049 
share 1 encrypted: 496631 decrypted: 3875 
share 2 encrypted: 569178 decrypted: 14097 
share 3 encrypted: 788925 decrypted: 23161 
share 4 encrypted: 360335 decrypted: 8357 
share 5 encrypted: 396526 decrypted: 26327 
share 6 encrypted: 472822 decrypted: 21937 
share 7 encrypted: 251095 decrypted: 13473 
share 8 encrypted: 222202 decrypted: 18321 
share 9 encrypted: 71865 decrypted: 8763 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
LEA RECOVER J 
key recovery request from LEA 
J SEND SHARE LEA 
23161 
/* 
output from juror 7 
juror port: 6007 
EA SUMMON! 
p:673 q:599 n: 403127 m: 401856 
public key: 907 private key: 387235 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 907 403127 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 673 599 
EA SUMMON J 
p: 541 q: 241 n: 130381 m:129600 
public key: 691 private key: 81211 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 691 130381 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 67411 decrypted: 10264 
share 1 encrypted: 119540 decrypted: 7949 
share 2 encrypted: 117940 decrypted: 17925 
share 3 encrypted: 17958 decrypted: 30712 
share 4 encrypted: 37591 decrypted: 17996 
share 5 encrypted: 16252 decrypted: 40364 
share 6 encrypted: 54236 decrypted: 36961 
share 7 encrypted: 57702 decrypted: 33639 
share 8 encrypted: 101254 decrypted: 24792 
share 9 encrypted: 94160 decrypted: 29604 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
LEA RECOVER J 
key recovery request from LEA 
J SEND SHARE LEA 
30712 
/* 
output from juror 8 
*/ 
juror port: 6008 
EA SUMMON J 
p:607 q:887 n: 538409 m: 536916 
public key: 823 private key: 11743 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 823 538409 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 607 887 
EA SUMMON J 
p:443 q:421 n: 186503 m: 185640 
public key: 121 private key: 164161 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 121 186503 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 443 421 
output from juror 9 
juror port: 6009 
EA SUMMON J 
p:313 q:229 n: 71677 m: 71136 
public key: 655 private key: 37903 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 655 71677 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 313 229 
output from juror 10 
juror port: 6010 
EA SUMMON J 
p:827 q:409 n: 338243 m: 337008 
public key: 865 private key: 16753 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 865 338243 
U CHALLENGE J user challenges this juror 
J SEND SECRET KEY U 827 409 
EA SUMMON J 
p:331 q:997 n: 330007 m: 328680 
public key: 509 private key: 12269 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 509 330007 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 231785 decrypted: 7221 
share 1 encrypted: 188635 decrypted: 6445 
share 2 encrypted: 27217 decrypted: 16347 
share 3 encrypted: 80887 decrypted: 27595 
share 4 encrypted: 31882 decrypted: 13909 
share 5 encrypted: 15455 decrypted: 34497 
share 6 encrypted: 4532 decrypted: 30525 
share 7 encrypted: 299004 decrypted: 25005 
share 8 encrypted: 253339 decrypted: 22169 
share 9 encrypted: 216669 decrypted: 20803 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
/* 
output from LEA 
*/ 
LEA RECOVER J 
key recovery request from LEA 
J SEND SHARE LEA 27595 379350749 
Request Jury's Shares 
EA SEND JURY INFO LEA 
info of juror 0 peter5 vivaldi 6005 J SEND SHARE LEA 21844 
info of juror 1 peter6 vivaldi 6006 J SEND SHARE LEA 23161 
info of juror 2 peter2 vivaldi 6002 J SEND SHARE LEA 25078 
info of juror 3 peter 10 vivaldi 6010 J SEND SHARE LEA 27595 
info of juror 4 peter7 vivaldi 6007 J SEND SHARE LEA 30712 
suspect's sk: 21127 
The following is the output of all entities when the user tries to cheat. 
/* 
Output from the user 
*/ 
User Registration Information null vivaldi 3838 
Trying to connect to EA... Connected to EA, request jury now!!! Request Jury 
EA SEND JKEYS U 
pk of juror 0 23 322061 pk of juror 1 151 710453 pk of juror 2 457 279827 
pk of juror 3 947 177311 pk of juror 4 461 634877 
Challenge or Accept jury now!!! next step: Generate Keys!!! 
Generate Keys and write to file 
p: 193 q: 181 n: 34933 m:34560 
public key: 719 private key: 33839 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 181 q: 179 n: 32399 m: 32040 
public key: 683 private key: 2627 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 179 q:113 n: 20227 m: 19936 
public key: 949 private key: 5693 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 199 q:191 n: 38009 m:37620 
public key: 643 private key: 20887 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 131 q: 137 n: 17947 m:17680 
public key: 939 private key: 659 e * d mod m = 1 
p:199 q:131 n: 26069 m: 25740 
public key: 797 private key: 6653 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 179 q: 47 n: 8413 m: 8188 
public key: 751 private key: 7403 e * d mod m = 1 
p:157 q:179 n: 28103 m: 27768 
public key: 197 private key: 3101 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 103 q: 191 n: 19673 m:19380 
public key: 431 private key: 5171 e * d mod m = 1 
p: 137 q: 157 n:21509 m:21216 
public key: 155 private key: 6707 e * d mod m = 1 
Read file and Generate Shares 
r = 724948453 coeff 0 = 33839 coeff l = 48 coeff2 = 312 
share 0 = 34199 share 1 =35183 share 2 = 36791 share 3 = 39023 share 4 = 41879 
r = 341324441 coeff 0 = 2627 coeff 1 = 1 coeff 2 = 726 
share 0 = 3354 share 1 =5533 share 2 = 9164 share 3 = 14247 share 4 = 20782 
r = 817614947 coeff 0 = 5893 coeff 1 =703 coeff 2 = 349 
share 0 = 6945 share 1 = 8695 share 2 = 11143 share 3 = 14289 share 4 = 18133 
r = 649524781 coeff 0 = 20887 coeff 1 =428 coeff 2 = 410 
share 0 = 21725 share 1 = 23383 share 2 = 25861 share 3 = 29159 share 4 = 33277 
r = 944068087 coeff 0 = 659 coeff 1 = 376 coeff 2 =158 
share 0=1193 share 1 =2043 share 2 = 3209 share 3 = 4691 share 4 = 6489 
r = 839164757 coeff 0 = 6653 coeff 1 = 923 coeff 2 =121 
share 0 = 7697 share 1 = 8983 share 2 =10511 share 3 = 12281 share 4 = 14293 
r = 998202529 coeff 0 = 7403 coeff 1 =486 coeff2 = 319 
share 0 = 8208 share 1 =9651 share 2 = 11732 share 3 = 14451 share 4 = 17808 
r = 767927183 coeff0 = 3101 coeff 1=442 coeff 2 = 474 
share 0 = 4017 share 1 =5881 share 2 = 8693 share 3 = 12453 share 4 = 17161 
r = 581973499 coeffO = 5171 
share 0 = 6040 share 1 = 7669 
r = 824250523 coeff 0 = 6707 
share 0 = 7759 share 1 = 9949 
Send encrypted shares to Jury 
send cac public keys to EA first 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i 
pk, n, r for i = 9 
send encrypted shares to jurors via EA 
shares to juror 0 
275095 238011 40948 84600 278641 
16555 23254 179358 38512 202310 
shares to juror 1 
174025 63640 
349809 617423 
coeff 1 = 489 coeff 2 = 380 
share 2 = 10058 share 3 = 13207 share 4 = 17116 
coeff 1 =483 coeff 2 = 569 
share 2 = 13277 share 3 = 17743 share 4 = 23347 
= 0 719 34933 724948453 
= 1 683 32399 341324441 
= 2 949 20227 817614947 
= 3 643 38009 649524781 
= 4 939 17947 944068087 
= 5 797 26069 839164757 
= 6 751 8413 998202529 
= 7 197 28103 767927183 
= 8 431 19673 581973499 











shares to juror 2 
36147 147225 
164241 238431 
shares to juror 3 
55233 117913 
36519 3728 93513 
shares to juror 4 
133036 81613 416270 273670 606899 
539352 599243 540041 308054 464585 
You are caught cheating!!! 
116431 171653 158394 
128136 66940 
key pairs in Ukey.dat before tampering 
*/ 
719 33839 34933 
683 2627 32399 
949 5693 20227 
643 20887 38009 
939 659 17947 
797 6653 26069 
751 7403 8413 
197 3101 28103 
431 5171 19673 
155 6707 21509 
/* 
key pairs in Ukey.dat after tampering */ 
719 683 949 643 939 797 751 197 431 155 
33839 
2627 
5893 20887 659 6653 
7403 3101 5171 6707 
34933 32399 
20227 /*tampered secret key*/ 38009 17947 26069 8413 28103 19673 21509 
/* output from EA */ User request record user info name uow 8888 0 U REQ EA summons the jury EAREQJLA EA SEND JKEYS U LA SEND J EA 
read jury's connection information Juror 0 peterl vivaldi 6001 peterl vivaldi EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA Juror 1 peter2 vivaldi 6002 peter2 vivaldi EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA Juror 2 peter5 vivaldi 6005 peter5 vivaldi EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA Juror 3 peter8 vivaldi 6008 peterS vivaldi EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA Juror 4 peter6 vivaldi 6006 peter6 vivaldi EA SUMMON J 0 JUROR SEND KEY EA U SEND SHARES EA callAcceptJ U SEND SHARES EA read cac pk, n and r 
34933 32399 20227 38009 17947 26069 8413 28103 19673 21509 
read all shares from user and send all shares to jurors 
juror: 0 encrypted share: 0 275095 encrypted share: 1 238011 encrypted share: 2 40948 encrypted share: 3 84600 
6001 23 322061 6002 151 710453 6005 457 279827 6008 947 177311 6006 
461 634877 
user key: 0 user key: 1 user key: 2 user key: 3 user key: 4 user key: 5 user key: 6 user key: 7 user key: 8 user key: 9 
719 683 949 643 939 797 751 197 431 155 






encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
juror: 1 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 617423 
juror: 2 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
juror: 3 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
juror: 4 
encrypted share: 0 
encrypted share: 2 
encrypted share: 4 
encrypted share: 6 
encrypted share: 8 
chosen no: 3 
jury send unchosen keys to EA 
juror: 0 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 7 
juror: 1 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 7 
juror: 2 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 7 
juror: 3 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 3 
decrypted share: 4 
decrypted share: 7 
juror: 4 
decrypted share: 0 
decrypted share: 3 
278641 encrypted share: 5 
23254 encrypted share: 7 
38512 encrypted share: 9 
366300 encrypted share: 1 
174025 encrypted share: 3 
306329 encrypted share: 5 
51346 encrypted share: 7 
encrypted share: 9 
encrypted share: 1 
encrypted share: 3 
encrypted share: 5 
encrypted share: 7 














55233 encrypted share: 1 117913 
116431 encrypted share: 3 171653 
158394 encrypted share: 5 36519 
3728 encrypted share: 7 93513 






encrypted share: 1 81613 
encrypted share: 3 273670 
encrypted share: 5 539352 
encrypted share: 7 540041 
encrypted share: 9 464585 
34199 decrypted share: 1 3354 decrypted share: 2 6945 
1193 
4017 
decrypted share: 5 7697 
decrypted share: 8 6040 
decrypted share: 6 8208 
decrypted share: 9 7759 
35183 decrypted share: 1 5533 decrypted share: 2 8695 
2043 
5881 
decrypted share: 5 8983 
decrypted share: 8 7669 
decrypted share: 6 9651 
decrypted share: 9 9949 
36791 decrypted share: 1 9164 decrypted share: 2 11143 
3209 
8693 
decrypted share: 5 10511 
decrypted share: 8 10058 
decrypted share: 6 11732 
decrypted share: 9 13277 
39023 decrypted share: 1 14247 decrypted share: 2 14289 
4691 decrypted share: 5 
12453 decrypted share: 8 
12281 decrypted share: 6 14451 
13207 decrypted share: 9 17743 
41879 decrypted share: 1 20782 decrypted share: 2 18133 
decrypted share: 4 6489 decrypted share: 5 14293 decrypted share: 6 17808 decrypted share: 7 17161 decrypted share: 8 17116 decrypted share: 9 23347 verify shares are correct recovered sk: 33839 honesty value: 1 
recovered sk: 2627 recovered sk: 5893 recovered sk: 659 recovered sk: 6653 recovered sk: 7403 recovered sk: 3101 recovered sk: 5171 recovered sk: 6707 not ACCEPT KEY 
honesty value: 2 honesty value: 2 honesty value: 3 honesty value: 4 honesty value: 5 honesty value: 6 honesty value: 7 honesty value: 8 
/* output from LA */ 
EAREQJLA send jury to EA peter 1 vivaldi peter2 vivaldi peter5 vivaldi peter8 vivaldi peter6 vivaldi 
6001 6002 6005 6008 6006 
juror port: 6001 EA SUMMON J 
p:443 q:727 n: 322061 m: 320892 public key: 23 private key: 83711 e * d mod m = 1 JUROR SEND KEY EA 23 322061 user accepts this juror EA SEND SHARES J read in cac shares from the user via EA share 0 encrypted: 275095 decrypted: 34199 share 1 encrypted: 238011 decrypted: 3354 share 2 encrypted: 40948 decrypted: 6945 share 3 encrypted: 84600 decrypted: 21725 share 4 encrypted: 278641 decrypted: 1193 share 5 encrypted: 16555 decrypted: 7697 share 6 encrypted: 23254 decrypted: 8208 share 7 encrypted: 179358 decrypted: 4017 share 8 encrypted: 38512 decrypted: 6040 share 9 encrypted: 202310 decrypted: 7759 EA CHOOSE KEY J chosen no: 3 
juror port: 6002 EA SUMMON! p:857 q:829 n: 710453 m: 708768 public key: 151 private key: 572647 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 151 710453 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 366300 decrypted: 35183 
share 1 encrypted: 547319 decrypted: 5533 
share 2 encrypted: 174025 decrypted: 8695 
share 3 encrypted: 63640 decrypted: 23383 
share 4 encrypted: 306329 decrypted: 2043 
share 5 encrypted: 164921 decrypted: 8983 
share 6 encrypted: 51346 decrypted: 9651 
share 7 encrypted: 349809 decrypted: 5881 
share 8 encrypted: 617423 decrypted: 7669 
share 9 encrypted: 579472 decrypted: 9949 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
juror port: 6003 
juror port: 6004 
juror port: 6005 
EA SUMMON J 
p:461 q:607 n: 279827 m: 278760 
public key: 457 private key: 195193 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 457 279827 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 36147 decrypted: 36791 
share 1 encrypted: 147225 decrypted: 9164 
share 2 encrypted: 269222 decrypted: 11143 
share 3 encrypted: 277293 decrypted: 25861 
share 4 encrypted: 260989 decrypted: 3209 
share 5 encrypted: 164241 decrypted: 10511 
share 6 encrypted: 238431 decrypted: 11732 
share 7 encrypted: 60048 decrypted: 8693 
share 8 encrypted: 203999 decrypted: 10058 
share 9 encrypted: 231086 decrypted: 13277 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
juror port: 6006 
EA SUMMON J 
p:883 q:719 n: 634877 m: 633276 
public key: 461 private key: 417605 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 461 634877 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 133036 decrypted: 41879 
share 1 encrypted: 81613 decrypted: 20782 
share 2 encrypted: 416270 decrypted: 18133 
share 3 encrypted: 273670 decrypted: 33277 
share 4 encrypted: 606899 decrypted: 6489 
share 5 encrypted: 539352 decrypted: 14293 
share 6 encrypted: 599243 decrypted: 17808 
share 7 encrypted: 540041 decrypted: 17161 
share 8 encrypted: 308054 decrypted: 17116 
share 9 encrypted: 464585 decrypted: 23347 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
juror port: 6007 
juror port: 6008 
EA SUMMON! 
p:281 q:631 n: 177311 m: 176400 
public key: 947 private key: 118283 e * d mod m = 1 
JUROR SEND KEY EA 947 177311 
user accepts this juror 
EA SEND SHARES J 
read in cac shares from the user via EA 
share 0 encrypted: 55233 decrypted: 39023 
share 1 encrypted: 117913 decrypted: 14247 
share 2 encrypted: 116431 decrypted: 14289 
share 3 encrypted: 171653 decrypted: 29159 
share 4 encrypted: 158394 decrypted: 4691 
share 5 encrypted: 36519 decrypted: 12281 
share 6 encrypted: 3728 decrypted: 14451 
share 7 encrypted: 93513 decrypted: 12453 
share 8 encrypted: 128136 decrypted: 13207 
share 9 encrypted: 66940 decrypted: 17743 
EA CHOOSE KEY J 
chosen no: 3 
juror port: 6009 
juror port: 6010 
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